Designing Health and Safety: Workplace Hazard Regulation in the United States and Canada by Rabinowitz, Randy S. & Hager, Mark M.
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 33
Issue 2 2000 Article 3
Designing Health and Safety: Workplace Hazard
Regulation in the United States and Canada
Randy S. Rabinowitz
Mark M. Hager
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell
International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rabinowitz, Randy S. and Hager, Mark M. (2000) "Designing Health and Safety: Workplace Hazard Regulation in the United States
and Canada," Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 33: Iss. 2, Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol33/iss2/3
Designing Health and Safety: Workplace
Hazard Regulation in The United
States and Canada
Randy S. Rabinowitz*
Mark M. Hager**
Introduction ..................................................... 374
I. The United States ........................................ 375
A. Legal Framework ..................................... 375
1. Coverage of the OSH Act ........................... 376
2. Federal and State Functions under the OSH Act ...... 377
B. Standards Development ............................... 378
1. Standard-Setting Procedures ........................ 378
2. Criteria for Standards .............................. 381
3. Restraints on Standard-Setting ...................... 382
C. Ensuring Compliance ................................. 383
1. Violations and Defenses ............................ 383
2. Inspections ........................................ 385
3. Penalties .......................................... 386
4. Alternative Compliance ............................. 389
5. Employee Rights ................................... 390
D. Information Systems .................................. 391
E. Training .............................................. 392
F. Workers' Compensation ............................... 392
II. Canada ................................................... 396
A. Legal Framework ..................................... 396
1. Coverage .......................................... 397
2. Federal and Provincial Functions .................... 398
B. Standards Development ............................... 398
C. Ensuring Compliance ................................. 401
1. Employer Duties ................................... 401
2. Employee Duties ................................... 402
3. Inspections ........................................ 403
Copyright 2000 by the authors. All rights reserved.
* Adjunct Professor, Washington College of Law, American University,
Washington D.C.
** Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University, Washington
D.C. Portions of this article were prepared by the authors as consultants for the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). The publication of this article
is authorized by OSHA, but the authors are solely responsible for its contents. The
authors would like to thankJennifer Costello, Eden Polatnick, and Michelle Von Euw for
their efforts.
33 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 373 (2000)
374 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 33
4. Joint Committees ................................... 411
5. Right to Refuse Dangerous Work .................... 413
D. Information Systems .................................. 417
E. Training .............................................. 417
F. Workers' Compensation ............................... 418
III. Comparative Analysis ..................................... 422
A. Coverage ............................................. 422
B. Standard-Setting ...................................... 424
C. Enforcem ent .......................................... 427
D. Employee Rights ...................................... 430
E. Workers' Compensation ............................... 432
IV. Conclusion ............................................... 433
Introduction
Workplace safety and health policy has been the subject of intensified
debate since the Republican party won majority control of the U.S. Con-
gress in 1994. Much of this debate has focused on how the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) can substitute consensus and
cooperation in place of its perceived reliance on adversarial regulation and
enforcement policies. Unlike adversarial methods, cooperative policies can
be expected to result in a reduced emphasis on sanctions for noncompli-
ance. Hence, it is important to examine the plausibility of the cooperation/
consensus approach. Can cooperation increase compliance with safety
and health rules in the United States, and can it reduce employee injuries
and illnesses? If so, under what conditions?
Canadian workplace safety and health policy provides a useful coun-
terpoint for addressing such concerns in the United States. Canada is
widely regarded within both organized labor and business circles in the
United States as having a progressive and protective occupational safety
and health program. In contrast to OSHA, the Canadian program relies
significantly more upon consensus and cooperation. It therefore seems
timely to examine Canada's program during this debate regarding the
direction of U.S. policy. In addition, the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) and its labor side agreement, the North American Agree-
ment on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), have recently increased the
cooperation and the exchange of technical information between the United
States and Canada on labor issues. This too makes a comparative study
both timely and potentially significant for emerging policy discussions.
This article describes and compares the main contours of U.S. and
Canadian workplace safety and health policy. Part I describes structures
and legal doctrines governing U.S. workplace safety and health.' While the
scholarly literature debating the appropriate direction of safety and health
policy is rich, few comprehensive summaries of OSHA law exist. Part 11
1. The analysis focuses on legal doctrines and largely omits discussion of current
OSHA policies. Because OSHA policies lack statutory mandate and may vary from
administration to administration, they merely illustrate current trends.
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describes the structures and legal doctrines governing safety and health
policy in the Canadian provinces. We are aware of no other comprehensive
review and analysis of provincial safety and health laws. Part III then com-
pares U.S. and Canadian law and suggests several broad conclusions. In
comparison to the United States, Canada provides employees substantially
enhanced rights to participate in safety and health decision-making and to
refuse unsafe work.2 Part IV concludes that such enhanced employee
rights are necessary adjuncts to cooperation and consensus in safety and
health regulation and enforcement. Although a regime of cooperation and
enhanced employee rights might rationally be expected to improve safety
and health performance, empirical evidence to prove this assertion is weak
at best. Additionally, without enhanced employee rights, a cooperation/
consensus regime could weaken workplace health and safety protection.
I. The United States
A. Legal Framework
The Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act of 1970 (the OSH Act
or the Act) is the preeminent federal law governing workplace safety and
health in the United States. Before passage of the Act, states regulated
occupational safety and health independently, some more stringently than
others. 3 Seeking to eliminate the economic competitive disadvantage of
employers who invested in safety and health compared with those who did
not, Congress mandated minimum national standards.4 It also created
three federal health and safety agencies: the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, to set and enforce mandatory safety and health
standards; the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, to
conduct research on occupational hazards and their control; and the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Review Commission, to review contested
enforcement actions.5 Each of these agencies is discussed in turn below.
Meanwhile, states continued to administer their own workers' compensa-
tion programs. 6
2. In contrast, Congress has repeatedly refused to grant U.S. workers these
enhanced rights. See generally H.R. REP. No. 103-825 (1994); H. REP. No. 102-663, pt. 1
(1992); S. REP. No. 102-453 (1992).
3. Prior to 1970, state regulation of safety and health was variable with regard to
enforcement and injury, and illness rates kept rising. Massachusetts passed the first
factory inspection law in 1877; by 1890, 22 states had passed laws permitting safety
inspectors into some workplaces. However, these early laws rarely were enforced. By
1968, only 20 states had occupational health programs. A survey taken that year found
that most states had more game wardens than safety inspectors. See generally OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PREVENTING ILLNESS AND INJURY IN THE WORKPLACE 209-211
(1985) [hereinafter PREVENTING ILLNESS]; NICHOLAS ASHFORD, CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE
47-51 (1976).
4. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) ("The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy
to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions... by authorizing the Secretary of Labor to set mandatory
occupational safety and health standards .. .."); see also infra note 7.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 7-10.
6. See infra p. 104 and discussion infra Part I.F.
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OSHA, which is situated within the Department of Labor, holds pri-
mary policy-making and enforcement responsibility. 7 OSHA sets stan-
dards, conducts workplace inspections, and issues citations and proposed
penalties for violations of workplace safety and health standards. It also
funds education and training efforts and state consultation programs,
monitors state OSHA performance, and coordinates voluntary compliance
initiatives.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), a
division of the Centers for Disease Control within the Department of
Health and Human Services, is OSHA's research partner.8 Though NIOSH
does not set or enforce safety and health standards, it has the same author-
ity to enter workplaces to accomplish its research mission as OSHA has to
conduct inspections. 9 NIOSH also develops non-binding scientific criteria
and recommendations for OSHA's use in standard-setting, conducts health
hazard evaluations, and provides technical assistance to labor, manage-
ment, and other government agencies.
The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) is
an independent, quasi-adjudicatory agency which resolves challenges to
OSHA citations, proposed penalties, and abatement deadlines. 10 Its cases
are usually initiated by employers who object to OSHA's citations.
Federal safety and health activities are funded from annual Congres-
sional appropriations. Penalty assessments from citations are not credited
to OSHA specifically. In contrast, workers' compensation, a state-run pro-
gram, is funded from employer-paid insurance premiums or other
employer assessments. Monies from workers' compensation are not used
to fund federal safety and health activities, but may enhance state activities.
1. Coverage of the OSH Act
The Act applies to all employers with one or more employees, except
state and local governments.' However, if a state administers an approved
state plan, it must also protect local government employees. 12 The Act
establishes a separate safety and health regime for federal employees. 13
The Act's reach is subject to several important restrictions. OSHA may
not regulate working conditions if another federal agency does so, even if
7. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 147-
8 (1991) (holding that reviewing courts should defer to Secretary of Labor when resolv-
ing ambiguous and conflicting regulatory interpretations).
8. See 29 U.S.C. § 669(e).
9. See id. § 669(b).
10. See id. §§ 659, 651(b)(3).
11. See id. § 652(5).
12. See id. § 667(c)(6). See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1960 (1999). Executive Order 866
imposes additional safety and health duties on federal agency heads. See Exec. Order
No. 12,196, 3 C.F.R. 1-2 (1996). The Congressional Accountability Act, 2 U.S.C. § 1301
(1995), provides safety and health protection for employees of the legislative branch of
the federal government; it incorporates the substantive requirements of the OSH Act, but
provides an enforcement mechanism controlled entirely by Congress.
13. See 29 U.S.C. § 668.
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workplace safety and health is only one of that agency's responsibilities. 14
For example, because the Mine Safety and Health Act regulates working
conditions in "coal or other mines," mine safety and health lies outside the
Act.15 Likewise, because the Environmental Protection Agency mandates
hazard warnings on pesticides, OSHA's authority to limit farmworker pes-
ticide exposure is circumscribed.' 6 Similarly, OSHA's authority over ves-
sels regulated by the Coast Guard and over government-owned, contractor-
operated, nuclear facilities regulated by the Department of Energy is nar-
row.1 7 The preemption of OSHA also has been interpreted to limit enforce-
ment of the Act in large segments of the railroad and airline industries.' 8
Congress further limits OSHA's coverage through its appropriations
power. Since the 1970s, Congress has banned routine inspections of
employers with fewer than ten employees or enforcement of the Act on
small farms without temporary labor camps. 19
2. Federal and State Functions under the OSH Act
The Act federalizes workplace safety and health regulation, but allows
states to play a role by authorizing federally-approved state programs so
long as they are as effective as the federal program.20 OSHA provides up to
fifty percent of the funding for approved state plans. Today, twenty-one
states and two territories operate approved plans covering both public and
private sector workers.21 Two additional states, New York and Connecti-
cut, operate plans covering only public sector employees.
A state plan must meet several requirements to secure OSHA approval.
It must designate a state agency responsible for occupational safety and
health, assure that state inspectors can enter workplaces, provide adequate
staff, and cover employees of the state and its subdivisions.22 In addition,
14. See id. § 653(b)(1).
15. See Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 801 (1977).
16. See Organized Migrants in Community Action v. Brennan, 520 F.2d 1161, 1166
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (explaining that Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act encom-
passes regulation of farm worker exposure to pesticides, thus preempting OSHA's power
to act).
17. See H.R REP. No. 103-825, pt. 1, at 62-63 (1994).
18. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1982 (O.S.H.R.C. 1980) (hold-
ing that preemption applies to airline maintenance workers because they are within the
class of persons intended to be protected under the Federal Aviation Act); Southern Ry.
v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 539 F.2d 335 (4;' Cir. 1976) (holding
that, in absence of Federal Railroad Administration regulation of employee safety in rail-
way shops and repair facilities, the Act applies to such functions).
19. See BENJAMIN MINTZ, OSHA. HISTORY, LAw AND PoLiCY 680-94 (1984). OSHA
continues to conduct inspections, other than general schedule, at small facilities covered
by the appropriations riders. See id. at 703.
20. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(b), (c).
21. States and territories operating approved plans include: Alaska, Arizona, Califor-
nia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, Wyoming, Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico. See 29 C.F.R. pts. 1952.90-.394(2000).
22. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(c).
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it must implement standards as effective as OSHA's. 23
Development of a state plan follows several stages. State law must
authorize a program submission to OSHA.24 OSHA then must review the
program to ensure inclusion of those elements necessary to render the pro-
gram effective and structurally complete.25 If compliance is adequate, the
plan is approved for a three-year developmental period.26 During this time,
while OSHA and the state may exercise concurrent jurisdiction, in practice
OSHA suspends its jurisdiction.27 To receive final approval, a state plan
must demonstrate effective actual operations and adequate staffing levels.
OSHA continues to monitor the performance of approved plans28 and may
withdraw its approval, but only after affording the state a hearing to defend
its performance. 29
States may regulate any hazard not covered by an OSHA standard.
Where an OSHA standard applies, state law is preempted 30 unless the state
regulates the hazard under an approved plan.31 In such cases, the state's
standard must be as effective as OSHA's. State plans may impose stan-
dards more stringent than OSHA's, provided they place no undue burden
on interstate commerce and are justified by compelling local conditions.32
B. Standards Development
1. Standard-Setting Procedures
There are three types of standards under the OSH Act: national con-
sensus or established federal standards under section 6(a); emergency tem-
porary standards under section 6(c); and permanent standards under
section 6(b).
Section 6(a) initially granted OSHA the authority to adopt existing fed-
eral standards and privately-established voluntary consensus standards
without notice and comment.3 3 Before this authority expired in 1973,
OSHA adopted hundreds of consensus rules as mandatory standards.
These rules represent the vast majority of OSHA regulations in effect today.
23. See id.
24. See id. § 667(b).
25. See id. § 667(c).
26. See id. § 667(e).
27. See id. § 667(e); 29 C.F.R. 1954.3 (2000); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHANGES
NEEDED IN THE COMBINED FEDERAL STATE APPROACH (1994).
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(f).
29. See id. § 667(g).
30. See Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992).
31. See Industrial Truck Ass'n v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir 1997) (holding
that OSHA standards preempt all state occupational and health regulations not submit-
ted in state plans).
32. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(c)(2); Approval: California State Standard on Hazard Com-
munication Incorporating Proposition 65, 62 Fed. Reg. 31,159 (1997) (observing that
any condition of concern to state officials might justify local regulation).
33. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (describing consensus standards).
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Most have not been updated since 1971 and many are out of date.34
Section 6(c) authorizes OSHA to issue emergency temporary stan-
dards (ETSs) without notice and comment rulemaking. 35 An ETS remains
in effect for six months. When published, it serves as a proposed perma-
nent standard.36 The Act provides that a final standard replacing an ETS
should be published within six months, but that timetable has proven
unrealistic.37 Courts regard ETSs with skepticism because they are
promulgated without notice and comment. In fact, no ETS has ever with-
stood court challenge.38 For this reason, OSHA rarely issues ETSs.
An ETS must be directed toward a "grave danger."39 Courts have inter-
preted "grave danger" to mean a life-threatening hazard 4° and have sug-
gested it must be one likely to materialize within the six-month period an
ETS is in effect.4 1 An ETS must also be necessary to protect workers from
that grave danger. An ETS is not necessary unless current exposure threat-
ens grave danger.42
OSHA issues permanent standards under section 6(b).43 Standard-
setting may be initiated when OSHA or NIOSH finds a new rule warranted
or when a private party petitions OSHA for rulemaking. 44 Hazards are typ-
ically identified for standard-setting after scientific research or experience
indicates a need. OSHA then reviews the issue and meets with interested
parties (e.g., labor, business, public health professionals) and with other
federal agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). It
may circulate draft proposed standards or hold public meetings, and also
may appoint an advisory committee to recommend a standard.45
34. In 1989, OSHA completed a generic rulemaking aimed at updating the exposure
limits for over 400 toxic substances first adopted in 1971. That effort was invalidated by
the 11I ' Circuit. See AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11" Cir. 1992).
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(1).
36. See id. § 655(c)(2).
37. See id. § 655(c)(3).
38. Several ETSs have become effective when no challenge was filed. For example,
the Sixth Circuit has denied a motion to stay the effectiveness of an ETS regulating
acrylonitrile. See Miwrz, supra note 19, at 126-129.
39. International Union v. Donovan, 590 F. Supp. 747 (D.D.C. 1984) (stating that
an ETS must address grave danger, even though permanent standard may address
merely significant risk). Courts have required that a consensus exist that the substance
an ETS deals with poses a hazard to workers. See Dry Colors Mfrs. Ass'n v. Department
of Labor, 486 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1973) (applying 29 U.S.C. § 655 to ETS regulations).
40. See Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 132 (5"'
Cir. 1974) (defining "grave danger" as the potential for incurable, permanent or fatal
consequences).
41. See Asbestos Info. Ass'n v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415, 422 (5"1 Cir. 1984).
42. See International Union v. Donovan, 590 F. Supp. at 756.
43. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b).
44. See id. § 655(b)(1).
45. An advisory committee recommends safety and health standards to OSHA. See
id. Its membership must reflect interests described in the Act, such as labor, business,
and state agencies. See id. § 656(a). The National Advisory Committee Act imposes
additional procedural requirements, such as a published notice of meetings, open meet-
ings, and transcribed proceedings. See id.
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OSHA standards may be adopted under section 6(b) only after notice
and comment. Prior to adoption, OSHA must publish the proposed stan-
dards in the Federal Register and allow at least thirty days for comments.46
However, substantially longer comment periods are typical. Proposals
describe anticipated benefits and anticipated economic and technological
consequences to regulated firms. If a public hearing is sought, OSHA must
hold one before an administrative law judge, allowing testimony by all
requesting parties and providing the opportunity for cross-examination. 47
In practice, OSHA also accepts post-hearing comments and briefs. It then
reviews the record and develops a final rule. OSHA must supplement the
final rule with explanations, published in the Federal Register, of how any
new standard that differs from an existing consensus standard better effec-
tuates the Act's purposes.48 The preamble must address significant issues
raised during the rulemaking and OSHA's resolutions of those issues.49
Rulemaking should conclude within six months,50 but courts treat this
deadline as precatory. 51 In practice, the development of standards may
span a decade.
Once issued, standards are subject to review in the federal appeals
courts. Many standards are controversial and judicial review frequently is
sought. Courts require substantial record evidence to support OSHA's fac-
tual findings, but allow more leeway for decisions based on policy infer-
ences.52 Unless a court orders otherwise, standards go into effect while
challenges are pending.53
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the general statute governing
agency procedures, requires prompt action by agencies on matters before
them.54 OSHA is sometimes challenged for failing to issue a standard in a
46. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(2).
47. See 29 C.F.R. § 1911.15(a)(3) (2000). At least one court has suggested that
these additional procedural safeguards are implicitly required by the hybrid rulemaking
procedures established under the Act. See Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d
467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
48. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(8), (e).
49. The preamble must reveal the policy issues confronted by an agency during
rulemaking and its reactions to them. See Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd,
407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968). An agency must respond to comments it receives
and explain its rule by reference to them. See Rodway v. Department of Agric., 514 F.2d
809, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
50. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(4).
51. See National Ass'n of Hispanic Am. Citizens v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 882, 888 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (commenting that § 655(b) timetables "are not etched in stone").
52. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(f). The substantial evidence test imposes a higher burden
on OSHA to justify its rules than the courts generally require of agencies engaged in
informal rulemaking. See Associated Indus. of N.Y. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d
342 (2d Cir. 1973); Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 467 (concluding
that OSHA policy decisions are not susceptible to factual verification and can be judged
only by whether they are rationally related to the agency's goals). But see AFL-CIO v.
OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11'' Cir. 1992) (applying the more stringent substantial evidence
test to all OSHA decisions).
53. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(f).
54. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). The APA authorizes courts to compel any agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. See id. In determining whether there has
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timely fashion. Courts have hastened rulemaking in some cases and
rejected efforts to speed regulation in others.55
2. Criteria for Standards
Before issuing a permanent standard, OSHA must find that significant
and ameliorable risks exist in the workplace. 56 To evaluate risk, OSHA
generally relies on workplace studies or extrapolates from studies of effects
observed in animals or from human exposures above workplace levels.
When regulating toxic or other health hazards posing significant risks,
OSHA must adopt the feasible standard that best protects employees.57 For
safety hazards, OSHA need not adopt the most protective standard.58
Substance-specific health standards usually require engineering and
work practice controls for compliance. Though personal protective equip-
ment and biological monitoring may be cheaper, OSHA deems them less
effective. In fact, courts have upheld OSHA's preference for engineering
and work practice controls.59
Standards must be both technologically and economically feasible.60
A standard is technologically feasible if the most advanced plants usually
been unlawful withholding or unreasonable delay, a court should consider time elapsed
since the duty to act arose, reasonableness of the delay, and consequences of the delay.
See Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In their decisions, courts usually
defer to an agency's rulemaking timetable. See id.
55. Courts have relied on the APA to speed OSHA's completion of standards gov-
erning formaldehyde, ethylene oxide, and cadmium, but have declined to intervene in
cases involving chromium, benzene, and second-hand cigarette smoke. Compare Inter-
national Union v. Donovan, 756 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (implementing orders
directing OSHA to speed consideration of formaldehyde regulation), and Public Citizen
Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (directing OSHA to
publish a proposed ethylene oxide standard thirty days hence), and Public Citizen
Health Research Group v. Brock, 823 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir 1987) (criticizing OSHA for
failing to adopt a short-term exposure limit for ethylene oxide in a timely fashion), and
In re International Chem. Workers Union, 958 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (ordering
OSHA to publish a cadmium standard by a certain date), with Oil, Chem. & Atomic
Workers Union v. OSHA, 145 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 1998) (declining to compel chromium
standard), and Action for Smoking and Health v. OSHA, 953 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(refusing to direct OSHA to expedite consideration of environmental tobacco smoke reg-
ulations), and United Steelworkers of Am. v. Rubber Mfrs. Ass'n, 783 F.2d 1117 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (accepting OSHA's timetable for completion of benzene standard).
56. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639-40
(1980) (suggesting that risks of 1/1000 are plainly significant, and authorizing OSHA to
err on the side of the worker).
57. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5); American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
490, 509, 540 (1981) (defining "feasible" as "capable of being done" instead of as requir-
ing cost benefit analysis).
58. A safety standard usually addresses acute, accidental harms. See International
Union v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
59. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981); American
Smelting & Refining Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 501 F.2d
504, 515 (8"h Cir. 1974) (holding that it is reasonable for the Secretary of Labor to rely
on effective and efficient air sampling, rather than sophisticated biological monitoring,
when determining health hazards).
60. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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could meet it. 6 1 Standards thus can force an industry as a whole to
develop and diffuse new technology. 62 A standard is economically feasible
provided it poses no long-term threat to an industry's profitability or com-
petitive structure, even if it is otherwise financially burdensome. When
determining feasibility, OSHA only considers the impact of compliance
costs on consumer prices and industry profitability.
63
In deciding whether to regulate toxins, OSHA may not use cost-benefit
analysis, which generally yields less protection than would feasibility anal-
ysis.64 Accordingly, OSHA may not compare the dollar value of risks
reduced (i.e., lives saved or injuries averted) to the dollar value of compli-
ance costs; rather, it must reduce significant risk so long as such reduc-
tions are economically and technically feasible. In contrast, OSHA may
use cost-benefit analysis for safety regulations, but is not required to do
so.65 Conclusions about significant risk and feasibility must rest on the
"best available evidence."6 6 However, because information about chronic
hazards is often imperfect, OSHA may regulate in the face of scientific
uncertainty. 67
3. Restraints on Standard-Setting
Administrative requirements outside the Act also affect OSHA
rulemaking. The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires OSHA to assess the
impact of its standards on "small entities" and to explain steps taken to
minimize those effects.68 These assessments are subject to judicial
review.6 9 The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
requires OSHA to solicit views from small businesses potentially affected
61. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1265 (D.C. Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).
62. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d at 1264.
63. See id. at 1265.
64. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 504-05. On the other
hand, OSHA must select the most cost-effective method of achieving its employee-protec-
tive goal. See Building & Constr. Trades Dep't v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258, 1269 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (finding rationale supporting cost-effectiveness analysis of regulations
compelling).
65. See International Union v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (concluding
that the § 6(b)(5) requirement that OSHA maximize employee health does not apply to
safety regulation). See also Control of Hazardous Energy, Supplemental Statement of
Reasons, 58 Fed. Reg. 16612 (1993).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5).
67. See generally Society of Plastics Indus. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2 nd Cir. 1975)(holding that OSHA should regulate when scientific evidence "points" in one direction,
but is not conclusive); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d at 1266 (hold-
ing that Congress did not expect OSHA to await the "Godot of scientific certainty").
68. See 5 U.S.C. § 601.
69. See id. § 609. Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the Secretary must assess the
impact of alternative compliance approaches on small business and consider ways to
reduce this impact. The Regulatory Flexibility Act neither overrides OSHA's duty to
protect employee health, nor requires it to adopt different standards for small and large
businesses. See Associated Fisheries of Me. v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104 (1" Cir. 1997).
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by a standard and to modify it if appropriate.7 0 The Paperwork Reduction
Act requires OSHA to estimate and minimize record-keeping burdens. It
also authorizes the Office of Management and Budget to determine
whether record-keeping or reporting requirements have "practical util-
ity."7 1 In addition, Congress may veto agency rules-including OSHA stan-
dards-through legislation. The agency may not readopt revoked rules. 72
Furthermore, for any rule with a likely aggregate impact above $100 mil-
lion, OSHA is required by Executive Order to regulate cost effectively and
to justify benefits against costs. 73
C. Ensuring Compliance
Employers must comply both with specific standards and the general
duty that workplaces be "free from recognized hazards likely to cause death
or serious physical injury."7 4 Employer violations may be penalized.
While employees are also required to comply with standards, no penalties
may be imposed against them for noncompliance.7 5
1. Violations and Defenses
A standard is violated when employees are exposed to a regulated haz-
ard about which the employer knew or should have known.76 An employer
also is responsible for exposures of employees of other firms present on the
site, if the employer either created or controlled access to the hazard.7 7
An employer breaches the general duty clause when a firm's employ-
ees are exposed to hazards recognized as harmful by the firm or its indus-
try that are likely to cause death or serious harm unless all feasible
abatement steps have been taken.78 Employers cannot be cited for general
duty violations where a specific standard applies, unless they know the
70. See Pub. L. No. 104-121, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 857 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
71. 44 U.S.C. § 3501. A regulation may not be enforced unless OMB finds it has a
practical utility. See id.
72. See 5 U.S.C. § 802.
73. See Exec. Order No. 12,866; see also American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452
U.S. 490, 540 (1981).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1).
75. See id. § 654(b).
76. See generally Brennan v. OSHRC (Alsa Lumber Co.), 511 F.2d 1139 (9"' Cir.
1975). The Secretary's burden is fourfold: (1) a specific standard applies, (2) the
employer fails to comply, (3) employees were exposed to the hazard, and (4) the
employer knew or had constructive knowledge of the condition. See id.
77. See Anning-Johnson Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comnm'n, 516
F.2d 1081, 1091 (1975); Grossman Steel & Aluminum Corp., 4 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1185
(O.S.H.R.C. 1976). See also BoIAT & THomPsON, OCCtwArnoNAL SAFETY AND HEALT LAv
411 (1988).
78. See National Realty & Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 489 F.2d 1257, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The general duty clause applies only to
recognized hazards, but feasible abatement is required without regard to whether
another employer or the firm's industry recognize the utility of such measures. See id.
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standard to be inadequate.79
Certain employer defenses to violations have been recognized by the
courts. For instance, courts excuse employer noncompliance where com-
pliance would pose a greater hazard than noncompliance and a variance
application has been filed or its filing would be futile. 80 The variance
application requirement sharply curtails this defense.
The courts also excuse noncompliance if it is due to unpreventable
employee misconduct. If the employer can show that employee misconduct
breached safety rules that were effectively communicated and uniformly
enforced, the courts will find no violation.81
The courts likewise have found that there is no violation if compliance
is infeasible. Compliance is infeasible if it is impossible or impedes busi-
ness performance. Additionally, to qualify for this defense, the employer
either must provide alternative employee protections or those protections
must be unavailable. 82 The infeasibility defense does not apply where
compliance would merely be difficult.
Finally, courts excuse noncompliance on multi-employer work sites for
employers who neither create nor control a given hazard.8 3 On such sites,
it may be difficult to identify the employer capable of either abating a haz-
ard or restricting employee access. Endemic to construction, this issue
increasingly arises in manufacturing as firms subcontract tasks formerly
performed in-house.84 An employer who neither creates nor controls a
hazard must nevertheless take steps to protect its employees from identifi-
able harm.85 In addition, professionals such as architects or engineers vio-
late the Act if they contractually have assumed responsibility for ensuring
safety8 6
79. See International Union v. General Dynamics, 815 F.2d 1570 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(holding that the Act requires application of the general duty clause to hazardous condi-
tions not adequately controlled by a specific standard where the employer knows that
employees remain in danger).
80. See General Elec. Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 576 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1978). An
employer seeking a permanent variance must demonstrate to OSHA that its alternative
compliance will provide protection "at least as effective" as would compliance. See 29
U.S.C. § 655(d). OSHA must notify affected employees of the variance application, may
conduct on-site investigations and must hold a hearing, if requested, before granting a
variance. See id. For purposes of the greater-hazard defense, an application for a vari-
ance is considered futile where the job will likely end before the application is consid-
ered, such as at a construction site. See id.
81. See New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 88 F.3d 98, 106 (2d
Cir. 1996).
82. See Dun-Par Engineered Form Co., 12 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1949 (O.S.H.R.C.
1986). Initially, the courts excused noncompliance only for impossibility, but the stan-
dard is now infeasibility. See id. See also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647
F.2d at 1273.
83. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
84. See IBP, Inc. v. Herman, 144 F.3d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (refusing to apply multi-
employer work site doctrine in the manufacturing context).
85. See Anning-Johnson Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 516
F.2d at 1090-91.
86. See CH2M Hill Central, Inc., 17 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1961 (O.S.H.R.C. 1997),
rev'd, 192 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding an engineering firm in violation because it
Vol. 33384
2000 Designing Health and Safety
2. Inspections
OSHA's main enforcement mechanism is work site inspections, of
which there are five types: complaint, general schedule, "fatality/catastro-
phe," imminent danger, and follow-up inspections. Complaint inspections
are generated by written complaints, filed by employees or their representa-
tives, alleging job hazards.8 7 General schedule inspections target high haz-
ard sites. However, data limitations constrain OSHA's ability to target
establishments based on actual injury experience. Fatality/catastrophe
inspections follow incidents resulting in employee death or hospitalization
of three or more employees. Imminent danger inspections follow upon
notice from any party of such danger. Follow-up inspections monitor
abatement of previously-cited violations.
OSHA conducts unannounced inspections., The Supreme Court
held that employers have reasonable expectations of workplace privacy.
Therefore, the Constitution prohibits inspections without either employer
consent or a warrant.8 9 The Constitution further requires that employee
complaint inspections be limited to issues raised in complaints.
Upon arrival at the work site, an inspector presents Department of
Labor credentials. An inspection begins with an opening conference, in
which the inspector explains the inspection's purpose and its scope. The
inspector may request that the employer produce safety and health records.
Employee representatives have a right to attend the opening conference
with the employer or, if the employer insists, a separate one.
While on site, the inspector conducts a walkaround, which employer
and employee representatives have the right to join.90 If no employee repre-
had a contractual right to oversee safety); Simpson, Gumpertz, & Heger, Inc., 15 O.S.H.
Cas. (BNA) 1851, 1867, 1869-70 (Rev. Comm. 1992), affd, 3 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1993)
(holding an engineering firm not in violation when its work had little relationship to the
hazards).
87. OSHA must initiate inspections in response to formal complaints. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 656(0. OSHA does not routinely initiate inspections in response to phone and other
informal complaints or in response to complaints from non-employees. See id. But see
L.R. Wilson & Sons, Inc., 17 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2059 (O.S.H.D. 1997), affid in part &
rev'd in part, remanded, 134 F.3d 1235 (4"' Cir. 1998) (initiating inspection in response
to the Assistant Secretary's observations).
88. OSHA may not give advance notice of an inspection, except in limited circum-
stances. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(0.
89. In Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), the Supreme Court ruled that
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
requires OSHA to seek a search warrant from a neutral magistrate before conducting a
nonconsensual workplace inspection. To obtain a warrant, OSHA must demonstrate
either that it has probable cause to believe a violation exists or that the workplace was
selected for inspection on the basis of neutral criteria. See id. at 320. This form of
"administrative" probable cause imposes less burden on OSHA than demonstrating
probable cause for a criminal warrant. NIOSH too must obtain a warrant before enter-
ing a workplace over an employer's objection. See BOKAT & THOMPSON, supra note 77, at
704-05.
90. Most courts have interpreted an employee's walkaround rights as designed to
assist the inspector and may be curtailed at the inspector's discretion. But see Chamber
of Commerce v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that the time spent
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sentative is available for the walkaround, as is often the case in non-union
facilities, the inspector is expected to conduct interviews with employees.
The inspection concludes with a dosing conference, in which the
inspector informs the employer of violations observed. The employer may
explain noncompliance, urging against unwarranted citations. Employee
representatives have a right to attend this conference as well, or a separate
one if the employer insists.
3. Penalties
For observed violations, OSHA issues citations within six months. A
citation must identify the standard violated, characterize the violation, pro-
pose a penalty, and set an abatement deadline. The Secretary must cite all
observed violations, other than de minimis violations, 91 or grant a variance
for alternative compliance achieving full protection. 92
Each citation is classed by severity: de minimis, non-serious, serious,
or willful. De minimis violations are those with no relationship to safety
and health. 93 No penalty is assessed and there is no abatement duty. Non-
serious violations are for hazards affecting health and safety but which are
unlikely to cause death or serious injury. Penalties are discretionary and
may reach $7000 per violation, but average approximately $800 per viola-
accompanying an OSHA inspector was for the employee's benefit and, therefore, should
not be considered hours worked under the Fair Labor Standards Act).
91. Section (a) provides that "if, upon inspection or investigation, the Secretary or
his authorized representative believes that an employer has violated a requirement of
section 654 of this title, of any standard, rule or order promulgated pursuant to section
655 of this tide, ... he shall with reasonable promptness issue a citation to the
employer." 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (emphasis added). Other sections also indicate a
mandatory duty to cite observed violations. First, section (0(2) permits employees dur-
ing inspections to notify inspectors, in writing, of violations and requires informal
review of charges that inspectors failed to cite observed violations. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 657(0(2). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1903.14(c). These required procedures make sense
only if the obligation to cite observed violations is mandatory. Second, any workplace
visit by the Secretary or the Secretary's representative constitutes an inspection under
the Act, triggering the mandatory duty to issue citations and appropriate penalties. Sec-
tion (a) authorizes the Secretary, upon presenting appropriate credentials, to enter a
workplace "without delay" and "to inspect and investigate." 29 U.S.C. § 657(a).
92. Section 9(a) authorizes the Secretary to issue "notices in lieu of citations" only
for de minimis violations: those with no direct relation to safety and health. For this
category, no penalties or abatement duties may be imposed. See 29 U.S.C. § 658(a). See
also 29 C.F.R. § 1903.14(a). Section 6(d) authorizes a permanent variance from a stan-
dard "after an opportunity for inspection where appropriate" if an employer demon-
strates that alternative compliance approaches "will provide employment and places of
employment to his employees which are as safe and healthful as those which would
prevail if he complied with the standard." 29 U.S.C. § 655(d). An employer may receive
a variance even where compliance has not been achieved. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 655(d)
(authorizing the Secretary to issue a permanent variance, after an opportunity for
inspection, if an employer demonstrates that alternative compliance means will provide
employment as safe and healthful as that provided by the standard), with 29 U.S.C.
§ 655(b)(6)(a) (authorizing the Secretary to issue a temporary variance but not to con-
duct an inspection to verify employer's representations).
93. See 29 U.S.C. § 658(a).
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tion.94 Serious violations are for hazards likely to cause death or serious
injury.95 Penalties are mandatory and may reach $7000 per violation.
Willful violations denote intentional employer disregard for safety and
health or indifference to the Act's requirements. 96 They carry a mandatory
minimum penalty of $5000 per violation, but penalties may reach as much
as $70,000. 9 7 OSHA may levy additional fines for repeat violations, which
are substantially similar to violations in prior OSHRC orders. Daily penal-
ties may lie for failure to abate within the time allowed.9 8
The Secretary must consider four factors in proposing penalties:
employer size, severity of violation, good faith, and prior violation history.
The Act is silent on the weighing of these factors, affording the Secretary
discretion in this area. For serious or willful violations, the Secretary may
levy penalties for each episode of employee exposure. This raises permissi-
ble fines, augmenting deterrence. 9 9 OSHRC is the final arbiter of penalties
proposed by OSHA.10 0 The Secretary has unreviewable discretion to with-
draw citations, reach settlements, characterize violations, and reduce or
eliminate penalties. 1 1 Though the Secretary must cite all violations and
penalize serious or willful ones, cases can be settled on any terms.
Unless an employer contests a citation, it becomes a final OSHRC
order, enforceable in federal court.' 0 2 To bring a contest, an employer
must file a notice within 15 days of the citation.1 0 3 Administrative law
judges (ALJs) of OSHRC have authority to conduct administrative trials of
contested cases. At the hearing, both sides may conduct discovery, intro-
duce evidence, call witnesses, and cross-examine adverse witnesses. After
the hearing, parties may file briefs amplifying their arguments. The Secre-
tary bears the burden of proving employer violations. An ALJ decision
becomes final thirty days after issuance, unless OSHRC grants review.
10 4
OSHRC has discretion to select cases for review. It may affirm, mod-
ify, or reverse ALJ decisions. While an OSHRC challenge is pending,
94. See AFL-CIO, DEPARTMENT OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALm, DEATH ON THE
JOB: THE TOLL OF NEGLECT 17 (9th ed., April 2000).
95. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(k).
96. See United States v. Dye Construction Co., 510 F.2d 78, 82 (10"h Cir. 1975)
(holding "evil motive" not an essential element of willfulness).
97. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(a).
98. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(d). An employer that cannot timely abate has two extension
options. It can seek a temporary variance if noncompliance stems from lack of materials
or equipment. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(6)(A). Alternatively, it can petition for modifica-
tion of the abatement date. See 29 U.S.C. § 659(c).
99. Compare Caterpillar, Inc., 15 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2153 (O.S.H.R.C. 1993) (author-
izing separate penalties for each instance of violations requiring individualized abate-
ment action), with Metzler v. Arcadian Corp., 1997 U.S. App. Lexis 12693 (5"' Cir. 1997)
(prohibiting separate penalties based on individual employee exposures under the gen-
eral duty clause).
100. See 29 U.S.C. § 6660); Reich v. Arcadian Corp., 110 F.3d 1192 (5th Cir. 1997).
101. See Sydney A. Shapiro & Randy S. Rabinowitz, Punishment Versus Cooperation in
Regulatory Enforcement: A Case Study of OSHA, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 713, 731 (1997).
102. See 29 U.S.C. § 659(a).
103. See id. § 659(c).
104. See id. § 6610).
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employer abatement obligations are tolled. 10 5 Final OSHRC decisions are
reviewable in federal appeals courts, which must affirm decisions sup-
ported by substantial evidence. 10 6 Further, OSHRC and the courts are
required to defer to OSHA's interpretation of safety and health
regulations.' 0 7
Employees may participate in employer-initiated OSHRC challenges by
electing party status.' 08 However, this does not alter the prerogatives of
the Secretary and employer to settle matters on whatever terms they
choose.' 0 9 Employees may initiate challenges only to the reasonableness
of abatement periods,' 10 and may not challenge an abatement that OSHA
seeks."'
Even when OSHA identifies an imminent danger, it cannot force
immediate abatement or removal of employees from exposure. Most
employers voluntarily correct perceived imminent dangers. If an employer
refuses, the Secretary must obtain an injunction in federal court to change
conditions which "could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious
physical harm immediately or before the imminence of such danger can be
eliminated."' 2 OSHA must demonstrate real risk of injury or death to
enjoin an imminent danger." 3 While an imminent danger remains extant,
employees have a protected right to refuse work." 4
OSHA can seek criminal penalties when willful violations of specific
standards result in employee deaths." 5 General duty clause violations,
even if willful or intentional, are not criminal. Criminal prosecution also
may lie against someone who provides advance notice of an OSHA inspec-
tion or who falsely reports information to OSHA 1 6 Only firms, not indi-
viduals, are subject to criminal prosecution. 1 7 Federal prosecutions
under the Act are rare. However, State prosecutions for crimes like man-
105. See id. § 657(b).
106. See id. § 660(a).
107. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144
(1991) (holding that the reviewing courts should defer to the Secretary of Labor when
resolving ambiguous and conflicting regulatory interpretations).
108. See 29 U.S.C. § 659(c).
109. See Cuyahoga Valley Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 474 U.S. 3, 7-8 (1985) (hold-
ing that the Secretary has unreviewable discretion to withdraw citations).
110. See 29 U.S.C. § 659(c).
111. See Local 588, 4 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1243, 1244 (O.S.H.R.C. 1976), affd, 557
F.2d 607 (7"' Cir. 1977).
112. 29 U.S.C. § 663(a).
113. See Secretary of Labor v. Dayton Tire, 853 F. Supp. 376, 380 (W.D. Okl. 1994)
(holding that OSHA must show that a reasonable person would conclude that a real risk
of injury or death exists because of lookout/tagout violations).
114. See Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 445 U.S. 1, 21 (1980).
115. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(e).
116. See generally Lynn K. Rhinehart, Would Workers be Better Protected if They Were
Declared an Endangered Species?: A Comparison of Criminal Enforcement under the Federal
Workplace Safety and Environmental Laws, 31 Am. CiuM. L. Ray. 351 (1994).
117. See United States. v. Doig, 950 F.2d 411, 412-13 (7h Cir. 1991) (holding that
Congress did not intend to subject employees to charges of aiding and abetting employ-
ers in criminal violations under § 666(e)).
Vol. 33
2000 Designing Health and Safety
slaughter and reckless endangerment may occur." 8
4. Alternative Compliance
Because OSHA's limited resources leave most workplaces uninspected,
OSHA, in recent years, has explored various cooperative enforcement alter-
natives. These leverage OSHA's limited resources, offering employers who
invest in safety and health a partnership with OSHA. l 9 Four main alter-
native approaches have been explored. Of those, three have been imple-
mented and one is subject to ongoing debate.
First, OSHA funds ninety percent of state programs consulting with
firms of 250 or fewer employees regarding compliance obligations. 120
OSHA grants one-year random inspection exemptions to employers who
correctly identify violations and voluntarily develop safety and health pro-
grams. 121 Firms using a consultant receive reduced penalties in subse-
quent inspections.' 22 Congress has supported state consultation
programs with steadily increased funding and recently codifying the con-
sultation program.' 23
Second, OSHA's Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) recognizes
employers with exemplary safety and health programs. Employers partici-
pating in VPP receive exemptions from general schedule inspections.' 24
Before employers can enjoy VPP benefits, their employees must consent to
their company's VPP participation. Also, OSHA periodically reevaluates
VPP eligibility.
Third, OSHA has tested a Cooperative Compliance Program (CCP).
CCP encourages high-incidence firms to adopt programs meeting specified
safety and health criteria. OSHA removes cooperating employers from pri-
ority inspection lists.' 25 Conversely, non-cooperating employers are
118. See Illinois v. Chicago Magnet Wire, 534 N.E.2d 962, 966-70 (Ill. 1989).
119. See generally Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 101.
120. See OSHA Instruction TED 3.5B (page V-3 item D, Scope of Request), Dec. 9,
1996, issued by the Office of Cooperative Programs [hereinafter OSHA Instruction TED
3.5B]. Consultants are not compliance inspectors, but they must refer to OSHA any
imminent danger they observe and which an employer refuses immediately to abate. See
40 Fed. Reg. 21,935-36 (1975). Consultants must also seek elimination of serious
hazards within a reasonable time or else report the refusals to abate. See id.
121. See 49 Fed. Reg. 25,082 (1984). OSHA refers to this as its Safety and Health
Achievement Recognition Program. See OSHA Instruction TED 3.5B, supra note 120, at
X-8 item D.
122. See 29 C.F.R. § 1908.7(c)(4) (1999).
123. See 112 Stat. 638, Pub. L. No. 105-197 (1998).
124. See 47 Fed. Reg. 29,025 (1982). Employers may be inspected in response to
employee complaints or after fatalities or catastrophes. See id.
125. The initial pilot of the CCP Program relied on workers' compensation data
rather than employer specific injury and illness data to target employers for participa-
tion. This targeting scheme was biased against of larger employers who likely would
have higher claims incidence (but possibly not higher rates of illness and injury). Since
OSHA began obtaining employer-specific injury and illness data from employers (1997),
it has relied upon employer-specific data to identify high hazard employers. See RANDY S.
RABINowrz, OSH LAw 72-73 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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inspected. This program has been invalidated by the courts. 12 6
Fourth, some advocate joint labor-management committees to enhance
job safety and health. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) prohibits
such committees if they are dominated by management or subject to
employer interference. 12 7 However, where employer activity in support of a
joint committee is mandated by law or established through collective bar-
gaining, there is no NLRA violation. 128 Committees may exist in non-
union workplaces if employees select their representatives. Many enter-
prises have established joint committees through collective bargaining.
Moreover, thirteen states mandate joint committees for some or all employ-
ers. 129 For instance, Oregon's fatality and injury rates fell sharply after its
1990 requirement took effect, with worker compensation premiums falling
by 12.2% in 1991, 11% in 1992, and 11.4% in 1993.130 Whether this
reduction can be attributed to the joint committee requirement is
unclear.13 1
5. Employee Rights
Employees have many rights under the Act, but limited means to
enforce them. Though they must comply with OSHA standards and regula-
tions, OSHA may not cite or penalize them for violations. 13 2 Employees
enjoy a right to participate in inspections, exercised most vigorously at
unionized sites. They may review relevant standards and the results of
exposure monitoring. 133 If an employee files a formal complaint alleging
126. See Chamber of Commerce v. Herman, 174 F.3d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
127. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994); see also Electromation, Inc. and Int'l Bd. of
Teamsters, Local Union No. 1049, AFL-CIO, 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163 (Dec. 16, 1992); Elec-
tromation, Inc. v. N.L.R.B, 35 F.3d 1148, 1158 (7"' Cir. 1994); E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 311 N.L.R.B. No. 88 (May 28, 1993).
128. See N.L.R.B. General Counsel's Memorandum in Vanalco. Inc., 1996 N.L.R.B.
G.C.M. Lexis 24 (Aug. 21, 1996).
129. See generally Greg Watchman, Safe and Sound: The Case for Safety and Health
Committees under OSHA and NLRA, 4 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y (1994). See, e.g., Con-
necticut (Worker's Compensation Act 28(a), 1993 Conn. Acts 228, Pub. Act No. 93-228
(employers of 25 or more employees or a higher than average injury and illness rates));
Florida (Act of Nov. 24, 1993, 1994 Fla. Laws ch. 93-415 (employers of 10 or more and
high hazard employers)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.231 (West 1993) (employ-
ers of 25 or more and high hazard employers)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-71-
1504 to 1505 (Supp. 1993) (employers of 5 or more)); Nevada (NEv. REv. STAT. ANN.
618.383(2)(b)(Michie Supp. 1993) (employers of 25 or more)); Nebraska (NEB. REV.
STAT. 48443 (Supp. 1993) (all employers)); North Carolina (NC GEN. STAT. 95-252
(1993) (employers of 11 or more and a higher than average workers compensation expe-
rience)); Oregon (OR. REv. STAT. § 654.176 (1991) (employers of 11 or more and high
hazard employers)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-501(a) (Supp. 1994) (high haz-
ard employers)); Washington (WASH. ADMIN. CODE 296-24-045(1) (1992) (employers of
11 or more)); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 23-2B-2 (1994) (Labor Commissioner
authorized to require joint committees)).
130. See David Weil, Implementing Employment Regulations: Insights on the Determi-
nants of Regulatory Performance, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELA-
TIONSHIp 429474 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997).
131. See id.
132. See 29 U.S.C. § 654(b).
133. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 657(c)(1), (3).
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violation of a standard, OSHA must inspect the site in question.13 4
Employees may accompany inspectors during walkarounds and may par-
ticipate in opening and closing conferences with the employer or sepa-
rately. If a firm contests violations, its employees may join by electing
party status. 135 Finally, employees may challenge the reasonableness of a
citation's abatement date. 13 6
Section 11(c) bans discrimination against employees who exercise
rights guaranteed by the Act. 13 7 However, employees cannot directly
enforce this ban, but rather must petition the Secretary to file suit. 13 8 To
prove a violation, the Secretary must show that exercise of protected rights
was a substantial cause for an employee's adverse treatment. OSHA also
has adopted regulations giving employees a right to refuse imminently haz-
ardous work pursuant to section 11(c).139 This right is similar to an
employee's NLRA section 502 right to refuse work where there is objective
evidence of abnormal danger.14 ° Additional OSHA regulations grant
employees a right to know about hazardous substances on the job and
access exposure information and medical records. 14 1 Many states also
have such right-to-know laws. However, OSHA preempts state laws requir-
ing that employees receive information about exposures.14 2
D. Information Systems
Analyzing the causes of occupational injury and illness requires good
data. OSHA therefore mandates that employers record and, in some cases,
report work-related injuries and illnesses. 143 Employers may also be
required to report injury and illness information to OSHA and the Bureau
of Labor Statistics.
About 1.1 million of the 6.5 million employers in the United States are
required to maintain work place injury and illness records. Employers sub-
134. See 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1). OSHA must keep the complaining employee's name
secret from the employer and keep the employee advised of the status. OSHA regula-
tions require inspections for charged violations of the general duty clause even though
the Act does not mandate them. See 29 C.F.R. 1903.11(a).
135. See 29 U.S.C. § 659(c). Even if employees elect party status, the Secretary of
Labor has unreviewable discretion to withdraw or settle citations. See Cuyahoga Valley
Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 474 U.S. 3 (1985).
136. See 29 U.S.C. § 659(c); Local 588, 4 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1243 (O.S.H.R.C.), affd,
557 F.2d 607 (7" Cir. 1977).
137. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(c).
138. See Taylor v. Brighton, 616 F.2d 256, 262-64 (6' Cir. 1980) (holding that the Act
does not create a private cause of action for employees discharged in retaliation for
reporting safety violations).
139. See generally Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 445 U.S. 1 (1980).
140. See Gateway Coal v. United Mineworkers of America, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
Under such circumstances, a no strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement will
not be enforced to prohibit an employee from engaging in concerted activity to avoid
performing abnormally dangerous work
141. See 29 C.F.R_ § 1910.1200(a).
142. See Industrial Truck Ass'n v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305 (9"' Cir. 1997); New Jersey
State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 774 F.2d 587, 593 (3d Cir. 1985).
143. See 29 U.S.C. § 656(c)(1); see generally 29 C.F.R. § 1904.
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ject to record-keeping requirements must maintain a log of all work-related
injuries and illnesses. That log must be posted in the workplace annually.
Employers must record all injuries, even minor ones, unless these injuries
did not result in any medical treatment or work restrictions. Furthermore,
employers must report fatalities and accidents resulting in the hospitaliza-
tion of three or more employees to OSHA within eight hours of their occur-
rence. However, employers with ten or fewer workers are exempt from
these record-keeping requirements, as are most employers in retail trade,
finance, insurance, and service industries.
NIOSH collects, analyzes, and disseminates data from various sources,
including its surveillance programs 144  and laboratory and field
research. 145 It disseminates information through its publications and a
toll-free information number. NIOSH also maintains two pertinent
databases: a bibliography of occupational safety and health literature
(NIOSHTIC) and the Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances
(RTECS).
State workers' compensation systems also maintain workplace injuries
and illnesses data. Nonetheless, workers' compensation reporting, which
captures only compensable injuries (such as those requiring medical treat-
ment or lost wages), is narrower than OSHA's. OSHA requires recording of
all injuries beyond first-aid cases occurring at the workplace, whereas
workers' compensation reporting, which varies by state, usually requires
reporting only after three to seven days' absence from work.
E. Training
OSHA operates a training institute for compliance officers and the
public. It also supports training on designated hazards by grantees.146
NIOSH funds training of safety and health professionals. 147
F. Workers' Compensation
Every state has enacted workers' compensation programs for employ-
ees injured on the job. 148 Coverage is no-fault; to obtain benefits, workers
need not prove any party's negligence, but only need to show that the
144. NIOSH operates, with its state partners, a number of surveillance programs,
including: Adult Blood Lead Epidemiology and Surveillance (ABLES), which identifies
cases of elevated blood lead levels among U.S. adults; Sentinel Event Notification System
for Occupational Risks (SENSOR), which provides surveillance for occupational lung
diseases; and Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE), which investigates
work sites where fatalities have occurred. See generally PREVENTING ILLNESS, supra note 3,
at 242-52.
145. Every year, NIOSH conducts hundreds of investigations at the request of work-
ers, employers, and governmental agencies to evaluate concerns at specific work sites
through its Health Hazard Evaluations, Intervention Studies, and Control Technology
Studies. See id. at 245.
146. See ASHFORD, supra note 3, at 265, 448.
147. See id. at 280, 445-47.
148. Workers' compensation is mandatory in all states except Texas and South Caro-
lina. See EDWARD M. WELCH, EMPLOYERS' GUIDE TO WORKERS' COMPENSATION 51 (1994).
Wisconsin developed the first workers compensation program in 1911. To meet consti-
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injury occurred in the scope of their employment. Compensation is made
exclusive, so employers are immunized from tort liability for injuries to
employees, except those inflicted intentionally. 149
States operate workers' compensation systems separately from each
other. Benefit payors are state-managed funds, private underwriters, or
both. Benefit payors receive premiums from employers. Premiums are
experience-rated for larger employers; that is, the rates are higher for high-
risk than for low-risk firms and industries.150
Workers' compensation does not cover all workers. Excluded workers
often include the self-employed; independent contractors; agricultural, cas-
ual or domestic workers; and small firm employees. 151 In 1972, the Report
of the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws rec-
ommended that states expand coverage to all employees disabled by their
jobs.152 While many state programs have extended coverage in the last
twenty years, coverage remains incomplete.
In theory, most workers' compensation systems compensate all inju-
ries arising from employment. Nevertheless, claims may be barred by
proof of an employee's willful misconduct, failure to use a safety device,
and intoxication or drug use. Though early statutes usually provided bene-
fits only for "accidental" injuries, coverage also theoretically has been
expanded to occupational diseases. 153 Occupational diseases are employ-
ment-related when disease-causing exposures in the workplace exceed
those of the general environment. 154 Chronic occupational diseases, such
as those from dust exposure, noise, fumes, and repetitive motion, are cov-
ered in principle. 155 However, in practice, chronic occupational diseases
may not be covered for a variety of reasons, including the uncertainty of
disease causation; employees' failure to know that their diseases are work-
related; difficulty in distinguishing work-caused diseases from everyday
diseases; frequent insurer contests of disease claims; exclusion of claims
for latent diseases in statutes of limitation; noncompensability of specific
diseases; and state requirements for minimum exposure periods within the
state before covering a disease. 156 Several states now exclude stress-related
tutional objections, these early programs were voluntary. See PREVENTING ILLNESS, supra
note 3, at 208.
149. See Emily A. Spieler, Perpetuating Risk: Workers Compensation and the Persistence
of Occupational Injuries, 31 Hous. L. REv. 119 (1994).
150. See John F. Burton, Jr. & James R. Chelius, Workplace Safety and Health Regula-
tions: Rationale and Results, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION-
smip 253, 264-67 (Bruce A. Kaufman ed., 1997).
151. See Welch, supra note 148, at 53-57 (1994)
152. See MICHAEL S. BARAm, ALTEMATIVES TO REGULATION 81 (1982).
153. See id.
154. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, -r AL., EMPLOYMENT LAv 429 (1994).
155. See Elinor P. Schroeder & Sidney A. Shapiro, Responses to Occupational Disease:
The Role of Markets, Regulation, and Information, 72 GEo. UJ. 1231 (1984)
156. See id.
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or psychological conditions not associated with physical injury.15 7 For
instance, Oregon limits compensation to injuries medically provable by
"objective findings," arguably eliminating compensation for many soft tis-
sue and psychological disabilities.
Workers' compensation benefits typically include medical expenses
and rehabilitation, partial indemnity for wage loss, and fatality compensa-
tion to surviving dependents of workers killed by or on their jobs. Statutes
or regulations set the benefits, which vary substantially from state to state.
Impairment/wage loss indemnity for total disability is typically two-thirds
the pre-injury wage, subject to a statutory minimum and maximum. 5 8
Temporary partial disability indemnity is two-thirds of the difference
between the worker's pre-injury and post-injury wages, subject to pre-
scribed maximums. Permanent partial disability indemnity is generally
awarded according to statutory schedules for specified injuries, according
to the degree of impairment or lost earning capacity for non-specified inju-
ries. Some states terminate benefits after a fixed period, even for recipients
still unable to work.159
Workers (or their families, where applicable) do not receive compensa-
tion for non-economic losses like pain and suffering. They likewise receive
no compensation for several types of economic losses, such as lost pen-
sions, deferred compensation, health and other benefits, and costs of care
by family members. These practices displace costs onto injury victims and
other social systems. 160
Medical care and rehabilitation expenses are generally compensable,
without charge to the injured worker,161 for as long as treatment is needed.
Medical costs have increased rapidly through the years and now represent
about fifty percent of total benefit costs. 162 Insurers, regulators, and
employers have proposed a variety of cost-containment strategies, includ-
ing: eliminating certain benefits; expanding employer and insurer power
over physician selection and over treatment and return-to-work decisions;
developing fee schedules to restrict unnecessary treatment; and merging
workers' compensation with employer-provided medical benefit plans.163
Critics of such efforts contend they may undermine employee rehabilita-
157. See Stratemeyer v. Lincoln County, 915 P.2d 175 (Mont. 1996) (holding that
where workers' compensation does not cover stress related claims, employee may file
tort action).
158. See Welch, supra note 148, at 107. See also STEvEN L. WILLBORN Er AL., EMPLOY-
mE Tr LAw: CASES ANn MATERtALS 957-58 (1998) [hereinafter WILLBORN, EMPLOYMENT
LAW].
159. See id. at 109-111.
160. See H.R. REP. No. 103-601, pt. 2, at 625-27 (1994) (describing cost shifting
between health care systems and workers' compensation).
161. See ARTHUR LARSON, WoRmaRs' COMPENSATION LAw: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT
445 (2d ed. 1992).
162. See LARSON, supra note 161, at 625-626.
163. See James Ellenberger, Remarks on Medical Care for Injured Workers, in REVEw
REGULATE OR REFORM? WHAT WORKS TO CONTROL WORKERS' COMPENSATION MEDICAL
COSTS (Thomas W. Grannemann ed. 1994).
Vol. 33394
2000 Designing Health and Safety
tion, medical confidentiality, and health care quality 164
Under the employment-at-will doctrine, employers may discharge
employees for any reason, including occupational disability. No require-
ment exists for reinstatement when an employee's work capacity returns.
OSHA gives workers disabled by a handful of toxins limited job-reten-
tion.165 By statute or case decision, several states now prohibit discharge
in retaliation for filing workers' compensation claims.' 66 The Family and
Medical Leave Act prohibits discharge (in firms with fifty or more employ-
ees) for absence up to twelve weeks a year due to serious medical condi-
tions, including compensable work-related conditions.' 67 Some states
extend protection for work-related absences and disabilities to employees at
small companies.' 68 Collective bargaining agreements frequently forbid
discharge for absence due to occupational illness or injury. Moreover, the
Americans with Disabilities Act requires employers to provide reasonable
accommodation to employees with serious disabilities who nonetheless
can perform essential job functions.' 69
Workers' compensation addresses injury prevention in various ways.
Experience rating on premiums theoretically induces employers to reduce
hazards so as to cut insurance costs. However, studies present mixed
results on whether these incentives substantially improve safety.170 Other
approaches in some workers' compensation systems include: safety audits;
mandatory safety programs and labor-management joint safety commit-
tees; safety training programs; and workplace inspections and penalty
assessments.1 71 Insurers sometimes consult with employers on loss pre-
vention and safety engineering.
When workers' compensation applies, it is the exclusive remedy for
employees injured on the job. Employees generally may not recover in tort
for work-related harms.' 72 An important exception is that employers may
164. See generally National Health Policy Forum, Workers' Compensation and Health
Care Reform: Is There a Need for Federal Action?, Issue Brief No. 650 (1994).
165. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. 1910.1025(k).
166. See Spieler, supra note 149, at 220-27.
167. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601.
168. See generally ROBERT BURGDORF, JR., DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
LA-w 905 (1995).
169. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,101.
170. See RichardJ. Butler, Safety Incentives in Workers' Compensation, in 1995 WoRK-
ERs' COMPENSATION YEAR BOOK 1-82, 1-87 (John F. Burton, Jr., & Timothy P. Schmidle
eds., 1994); James R. Chelius & Robert S. Smith, Experience-Rating and Injury Preven-
tion, in SAFETY AND THE WORKFORCE 128 (John D. Worrall ed., 1983). See also Leslie 1.
Boden, Creating Economic Incentives: Lessons from Workers' Compensation Systems, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SEvENTH ANNUAL MEETING 282 (Industrial Relations Research
Association, 1995).
171. See Spieler, supra note 149, at 244-259. A worker's compensation related
requirement for workplace inspections and penalty assessments may be preempted by
OSH Act. See Ben Robinson v. Texas Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 934 S.W.2d 149
(Tx. Ct. App. 1996).
172. See Note, Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers Compensa-
tion Statutes, 96 HAv. L. REv. 1641, 1643 (1983).
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be liable in tort for intentional harms.173 Moreover, workers' compensa-
tion does not bar suit for tort damages against third parties, such as the
makers of defective products causing workplace injuries. In some states,
the third party may seek contribution and indemnity from the
employer. 174 In many, the payor of workers' compensation benefits may
secure reimbursement from tort damages workers receive in third-party
suits.175 Finally, workers' compensation typically does not prevent
employee redress for non-physical harms.176
II. Canada
A. Legal Framework
In 1972, Saskatchewan enacted comprehensive occupational safety
and health legislation. 177 Since then, every province with the exception of
British Columbia has adopted laws based on the Saskatchewan model.
Provincial laws aim to protect against job site hazards regardless of employ-
ment relationships. Compliance duties are usually imposed not just on
employers, but also on employees and others whose conduct affects work-
place safety: owners, suppliers, general contractors, architects, professional
engineers, and supervisors.
Joint safety and health committees are Canada's key institutions for
workplace safety and health. Government promotes private resolution of
safety and health concerns through technical advice and support to
employers and workers and, when private resolution fails, through inspec-
173. Many states allow worker tort actions for intentional harms. See id. See also
Mark M. Hager, Harassment as a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile Environment Liability Should
Be Curtailed, 30 CONN. L. REv. 375, 430 n.107 (1998). Often, the employer must be
"substantially certain" of an effect before a tort action is permitted. See Beauchamp v.
Dow Chem. Co., 398 N.W. 2d 882, 893 (Mich. 1986) (holding tort liability lies if
employer was substantially certain injury would result and intended the act which
caused injury).
174. See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 282 N.E. 2d 288 (1972).Few states allow for contri-
bution and indemnity from employers. See Note, supra note 172, at 1653.
175. See WILLBORN, EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 158, at 981.
176. See Olive v. City of Scotsdale, No. 94-1028 PHX EHC, 1996 WL 435132, at *2-3
(D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 1996) (stating the general rule under the Workmen's Compensation
Act that metal illness, injury or condition is not considered a personal injury compensa-
ble under the Act unless the injury fits into a narrow exception); Meyers v. Arcudi, 915
F. Supp. 522, 524 (D. Conn. 1996) (citing amendment to Worker's Compensation Act's
exclusivity provision which states that the Worker's Compensation Act does not bar a
tort claim for emotional distress where the distress did not arise from a physical injury);
Day v. NLO Inc., 811 F. Supp. 1271, 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (holding that employees'
mental claims are actionable in tort, as Ohio's exclusivity provision does not cover
mental injury arising from a mental stimulus); Kirk v. Smith, 674 F. Supp. 803, 806-07
(D. Colo. 1987) (concluding that emotional injuries are not covered by the Colorado
Workmen's Compensation Act).
177. Of course, many provinces had legislation addressing specific safety and health
issues or hazards in specific industries, such as mining, prior to 1972. See CANADIAN
AUTO WORKERS, SUBMISSION TO ROYAl. COMMISSION ON WORKER'S COMPENSATION IN BRITISH
COLUMBIA 6 (1997).
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tions and prosecutions. Laws define the rights and duties of employers
and employees.
In several provinces, two separate agencies address workplace safety
and health: a labor ministry handling regulation and inspections; and a
board handling worker's compensation for job injuries. In several prov-
inces, one agency combines both functions. 178 Workers' compensation
assessments may be used to fund governmental safety and health activi-
ties,179 supplementing the Labor Ministry's appropriated budget.
1. Coverage
Provincial safety and health laws apply to all public and private
employers.180 These laws require employers to protect everyone at the job
site, regardless of employment status. However, prison inmates, farm
workers, university teachers, and owners or occupants working in private
residences may be excluded from coverage.
Compliance duties bind all persons performing services for compen-
sation. Suppliers must furnish materials and equipment safe for its
intended use.181 Site owners bear responsibility for plant areas or activities
not directly controlled by any employer. 182 Contractors must ensure that
activities not controlled by on-site employers are safe. 18 3 Supervisors must
ensure that workers are aware of risks. 184 Professionals, such as engineers
or architects, may also have compliance duties.'85
178. These provinces are Quebec, New Brunswick, and British Columbia. In Quebec,
the Commission de la Sante et de la Securite du Travail (CSST) inspects work premises and
provides compensation for employees who suffer a work related injury. See An Act
Respecting Occupational Health & Safety Act, R.S.Q., c. S-2.1, ch. IX, div. II [hereinafter
Quebec Safety Act]. See also Occupational Health & Safety Act, R.S.N.B, c. 0-0.2, (1994)
[hereinafter New Brunswick Safety Act]. In British Columbia one statute governs both
workers' compensation and occupational safety and health. As a result, rights and
duties detailed in law in other provinces may be guaranteed by regulation in British
Columbia. See, e.g., A Comparison of Occupational Health & Safety Statutes: A Briefing
Paper 2 (last modified Apr. 25, 1999) <http://www.worksafebc.com/policy/royalcom-
mission/brief7.asp> [hereinafter Briefing Paper].
179. See GENERAL AcCOUrTING OfiICE, B-250248, GAO/HRD-94-15FS, 13 (Dec. 6,
1993).
180. The compliance duties of self-employed persons may be separately described.
See, e.g., Quebec Safety Act, ch. II, art. 7; The Occupational Safety & Health Act, S.S., c.
0-1.1, pt. II, § 5 [hereinafter Saskatchewan Safety Act] (providing that self-employed
persons are subject to the provisions of the Acts).
181. See Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. II, § 8.
182. See id. pt. II, § 7.
183. See id. pt. II, § 6.
184. See, e.g., An Act Respecting Occupational Health & Safety Act, R.S.N.S., ch. 7,
§ 23 [hereinafter Nova Scotia Safety Act] (stating that duty requirements of the Act are
imposed primarily on person with greatest degree of control over matters that are sub-
ject of duty).
185. See id. § 21.
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Comparison of Coverage Between United States and Canada
United States Canada 1 8 6
Federal Employees Yes Yes
Local Government Employees In state plan jurisdictions Yes
Self-employed No Yes
Building/project Owners No Yes
Supervisors No Yes
Professionals (Architects, Etc.) Only if contractually assumed Yes
responsibility for safety
Equipment Suppliers No Yes
2. Federal and Provincial Functions
Provincial governments exclusively regulate occupational safety and
health within their jurisdictions. 187 Each province establishes and oper-
ates its programs independently. Federal law governs federal employees,
employees of approximately forty government corporations and agencies,
and national industries.'88 Though the federal government may work with
provinces on harmonized approaches to common issues, it does not pro-
vide official guidance to or promulgate rules binding on the provinces.
Provincially-created rights exclude workers and establishments under fed-
eral jurisdiction. 18 9
Since 1988, an integrated Canadian approach to hazard communica-
tion has been implemented. Each province has adopted similar laws. Each
requires employers to label hazardous products and provide material safety
data sheets to chemical workers, according to uniform requirements. 190
Where one jurisdiction allows a trade secret exemption from risk disclo-
sure requirements, other jurisdictions must recognize it.19 1
B. Standards Development
Though Canadian law imposes few procedural requirements for the
adoption of safety and health standards, in practice both federal and pro-
vincial governments do obtain extensive public input. Standards usually
represent bilateral recommendations of labor and employer associations.
186. Ontario and Alberta statutes do not apply to farming operations or domestic
work; the Ontario Act does not apply to teachers or teaching assistants.
187. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 179, at 12 (Dec. 6, 1993).
188. See generally An Overview to the Canada Labour Code, An Overview of Part II of
Canada Human Resources Development: Canada National Labour Code. National
industries include rail, highway transport, telecommunications, pipelines, canals, fer-
ries, tunnels and bridges, shipping, airports, banks, grain elevators and certain feed
mills, and products, such as atomic energy, explosives and pesticides. See id.
189. See DOUGLAS G. GILBERT & GERALD P. HEcc, AN, PRESENTATION TO THE ABA LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW SECTION, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH IN CANADA AND THE
UNITED STATEs, at n.14 (August 1998) (on file with authors).
190. See MICHAEL GROssmAN, THE LAw OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY IN ONTA-
mo§ 11.6 (2d ed. 1994).
191. See id.
Vol. 33
2000 Designing Health and Safety
A review of provincial exposure limits reveals that many requirements are
based on threshold limits set by the American Conference of Government
Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) or exposure limits set by OSHA.
At the federal level, the Review Committee on Technical Revisions to
the Canada Occupational Safety and Health Regulations (Review Commit-
tee), appointed by the labor ministry (Labour Canada), identifies regula-
tions needing revision. A working group of the Review Committee
(Working Group), with equal labor and management representation, is
established to devise revisions. Both labor and management submit posi-
tion statements. The Working Group then identifies areas of consensus.
Labour Canada may fund research requested by labor and provide techni-
cal advice to the Working Group. Other parties may offer advice, but only
through labor or management representatives. Where no consensus is
reached, the Review Committee may try to resolve disputed issues. If it
cannot, Labour Canada makes the final determination regarding
regulations.192
Once all groups involved agree on a proposed rule, Labour Canada
drafts a regulatory impact analysis, with input from labor and manage-
ment.19 3 The Working Group facilitator then prepares a report and for-
wards consensus recommendations to the Review Committee. Labour
Canada prepares a similar report for the Review Committee on non-consen-
sus issues. The amended regulations are published for comment after
Review Committee consideration. The Working Group considers com-
ments and formulates amendments before sending them to the Review
Committee. The law establishes no decisional criteria to guide the Work-
ing Group in designing standards. Final regulations are published in the
Canada Gazette.
Like the federal government, provinces strive to regulate by consensus.
In most provinces, consensus regulations are recommended by the Minis-
ter of Labour to the Lieutenant Governor in Council, the provincial head of
government. In British Columbia and Quebec, the workers' compensation
board has independent authority to issue regulations.19 4 Panels recom-
mending regulations usually comprise exclusively labor and management
representatives in equal numbers.19 5 Provincial staff select discussion par-
ticipants and provide technical assistance, but do not dictate the out-
192. See generally DENNISON ASsOCIATES INC., COMPILATION OF CANADIAN HEALTH AND
SAFETY STATUTES AND REGULATIONS, Guiding Principles of the Federal Regulatory Policy
(prepared for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Office of ePolicy)
(1998) (on file with authors).
193. See id. The Federal government has developed a statement of principles requir-
ing that regulations be accompanied by an analysis of their social and economic impacts
and promising that the government will ensure that benefits exceed cost before proceed-
ing with new regulatory proposals. See id.
194. See KATHLEEN M. REST & NIcHOLAs A. ASHFORD, OcCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND
SAFETY IN BRITISH COLUMBIA: AN ADMINISTRATIVE INVENTORY OF THE PREVENION AcTIVITIEs
OF THE WORKIS' COMPENSATION BOARD, 25-26, 28 (Ashford Assocs. ed. 1997) [hereinaf-
ter REST & ASHFORD].
195. In some provinces, such as British Columbia, panels to recommend regulations
may also include public representatives. See id. at 15, 28 (discussing structure of British
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comes.196 Most provincial laws are silent on criteria for standards. In
Prince Edward Island, for instance, the law does not authorize regulation
of toxins, but instead requires employers to secure hazard information
from suppliers and furnish it to exposed employees. 197 Labor-manage-
ment panels may seek comments from interested parties and may hold
public hearings.19 8 Final revisions to regulations must be published in the
provincial Gazette before they can take effect. 199 Judicial review is not
available.20 0
Consensus approach has principally resulted in adoption of ACGIH
limits. Aside from these exposure limits, few comprehensive standards
include monitoring or other auxiliary requirements. On the other hand,
the consensus approach has led to adoption of a repetitive motion standard
in British Columbia as well as workplace violence, repetitive motion, and
harassment standards in Saskatchewan. 20 1
Some provinces authorize more comprehensive regulation of "desig-
nated" toxins. For such rules, notice of an intent to regulate must be pub-
lished in the provincial Gazette. 20 2 Consensus is more difficult to reach on
comprehensive rules and, therefore, few are issued. While most provinces
have authority to regulate the manufacture and properties of products, they
rarely do. Provincial law generally allows compliance waivers for employ-
ers who meet or exceed standards without literal compliance. 20 3 A tripar-
Columbia's Panel of Administrators). In Ontario, the government appoints a panel
chair, otherwise membership on the panel is split between labor and management.
196. In some instances, bipartite decision-making is mandated by law; in others reli-
ance on bipartite decision-making is merely the preferred approach of the government.
See, e.g., REST & ASHFORD, supra note 194, at 65 (noting that British Columbia Board of
Governors described that province's current Regulation Review process as bipartite
model).
197. Occupational Health & Safety Act, R.S.P.E.I., ch. 0-1, pt. IV, § 24 (1996) [herein-
after Prince Edward Safety Act].
198. In Ontario, separate procedures govern the "designated substance" regulations.
See generally Ontario Safety Act §§ 33-43. These regulations, like comprehensive health
standards, must be published for comment in draft form. See id. § 35(a)-(b). In British
Columbia, the Workers' Compensation Board must give public notice of revisions to
regulation and hold a public hearing before finalizing the revisions. See REST & ASH-
FORD, supra note 194, at 69.
199. See Ontario Safety Act § 35(a)-(b)(stating that regulations governing designated
substances must be published in the Gazette); Quebec Safety Act, ch. XII, arts. 224-226;
Workplace Safety & Health Act, R.S.M. ch. W210, § 19(2) [hereinafter Manitoba Safety
Act]. See also Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. VII, § 44(4) (providing that regulations are
not enforced until at least sixty days after appearing in the Saskatchewan Gazette); REST
& ASHFORD, supra note 194, at 67, 71 (referring to publishing of regulation revisions
prior to finalizing).
200. See GENERAL AccouwnNG OiicE, supra note 179, at 22.
201. See The Occupational Safety & Health Regulations, 1996, pt. II, § 36-37, pt. VI,
§ 81 [hereinafter Saskatchewan Safety Regulations].
202. See GROSSMAN, supra note 190.
203. See Ontario Safety Act §70(2)(3) (providing that Lieutenant Governor may make
regulations exempting workplaces or employers from provisions of Safety Act); Saskatch-
ewan Safety Act, pt. VII, § 46 (providing that director may exempt any person from regu-
lations if satisfied that standards of health and safety will not be materially affected);
Manitoba Safety Act § 21 (stating that, upon application, director may choose to vary
any provision or standard).
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tite working group to help harmonize regulations across Canada was
launched in 1992, but was discontinued in 1996 after labor and manage-
ment each complained about the working group's direction.
Many provinces guarantee overexposed workers the option of alternate
work, with no loss of pay or benefits, when temporary removal from a haz-
ard will aid their return to work.20 4 Alternate work, if requested, may be
required for pregnant and lactating women.20 5 Some provinces character-
ize such alternate assignments as disability protection. The government
may shoulder some of the cost of maintaining wages associated with these
transfers.20 6 Absent employee consent, employee medical information is
generally shielded from disclosure to the employer.207
C. Ensuring Compliance
Compliance policy relies mainly on employer-employee joint commit-
tees and safety and health representatives to identify and correct hazards.
Government facilitates voluntary compliance and pursues formal enforce-
ment when such voluntary compliance fails. Despite government's limited
enforcement role, Canada has three to seven times more inspectors per cov-
ered worker than does the United States.208
1. Employer Duties
Canadian jurisdictions impose on employers a general duty to protect
against job site danger.20 9 Of course, employers must also comply with
specific orders, rules, and laws. 210 Where rules are inadequately protec-
204. See Manitoba Safety Act § 52 (stating that the director may order temporary
removal upon the advice of the chief occupational medical officer). See generally Onta-
rio Safety Act § 43(10)(a)-(b); Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. III, § 21(3); An Act Respect-
ing Occupational Health & Safety in the Province, NFLD. R.S. ch. 0-3, § 45(2)-(3)
[hereinafter Newfoundland Safety Act]; Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. V, § 36. In British
Columbia, protective reassignment is not guaranteed, but if it is provided, employee
wages and benefits must be maintained. See Regulation 8.24(7). In Quebec, workers
overexposed to toxins have a right, limited by available funding, to reassignment. See
Quebec Safety Act, ch. III, div. I, art. 32-39.
205. See Quebec Safety Act, div. 1, §4, art. 40-48 (1994).
206. See, e.g., Quebec Safety Act, ch. XV, arts. 249-250 (requiring that the government
pay part of sumt needed for application of the Act).
207. See Ontario Safety Act § 63(2); Quebec Safety Act, ch VIII, div. IV, art. 129; Sas-
katchewan Safety Act, pt. X, § 65; Manitoba Safety Act § 51(3). In Prince Edward Island,
an employer is barred from altering an employee's status on the basis of a medical exam.
See Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. 5, § 25(2).
208. GENERAL AccoUNTING OFFicE, supra note 179, at 18.
209. The nature of this duty varies slightly. In Manitoba, employers must ensure
safety "so far as is reasonably practicable." Manitoba Safety Act § 4(1)(a). In Ontario,
employers must take "every precaution reasonable." Ontario Safety Act § 25(2)(h). This
duty extends to independent contractors supervised by an employer. See R. v. Wyssen,
(1992) 10 O.R.3d 193 (Ontario Court of Appeals); Quebec Safety Act, ch. III, div. II, § 2,
art. 51(1)-(12) (providing general obligations of employers with respect to employees).
See also New Brunswick Safety Act § 9; Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. III, § 13; New-
foundland Safety Act § 4; Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. II, § 3(a).
210. See generally Ontario Safety Act § 25; Manitoba Safety Act § 4(1)(b); New Bruns-
wick Safety Act § 9; Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. III, § 13; Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt.
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tive, the general duty may require prevention beyond what specific stan-
dards require.
Provincial laws include detailed lists of employer duties. Employers
must cooperate with government inspectors and with joint committees or
representatives. 211 Materials and equipment must be furnished, main-
tained, and used according to manufacturer instructions. Workplace struc-
tures, such as floors, scaffolds, walls, and so on, must be capable of
withstanding expected loads.212 Employers must provide information to
joint committees on likely risks and must report fatalities, injuries, and
near misses to workers and the government. 213 Employers must provide
safety training to all workers and ensure their competent supervision.214
Several jurisdictions impose additional duties. In Alberta and Sas-
katchewan, employers must conduct regular inspections and correct identi-
fied hazards.215 Employers in Ontario, Quebec, Newfoundland, and
Saskatchewan must also provide occupational health services.216
2. Employee Duties
Canadian laws impose enforceable duties on employees. Employees
must: comply with laws, rules, and orders; report hazards; wear safety gear;
protect themselves and others; and cooperate with inspectors and joint
committees or representatives. Additionally, in Saskatchewan, employees
must refrain from harassing others. Employees may be sanctioned for
violations.
I. § 3(e). British Columbia law uniquely includes no specific employer compliance
duties. Regulations issued by the Workers' Compensation Board, however, do impose
such duties.
211. See generally Ontario Safety Act §§ 25-26; Quebec Safety Act, ch. III, div. I, §2,
art. 51(14); New Brunswick Safety Act § 9(2)(e); Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. 1II,
§ 13(2)(e); Newfoundland Safety Act § 5(f); Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. II, § 3(b); Man-
itoba Safety Act § 4(2)(e)-(D.
212. See, e.g., Ontario Safety Act § 25(1)(e).
213. See id. § 25(2)(); Quebec Safety Act, ch. III, div. II, § 2, art. 52; Prince Edward
Safety Act, pt. III, § 13(2)(b); Newfoundland Safety Act § 5(c).
214. Every province except Alberta and Saskatchewan imposes on an employer a duty
to train. See Quebec Safety Act, ch. III, div. II, § 2, art. 51(9); New Brunswick Safety Act
§ 9(2)(c); Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. III, § 13(2)(c). See also Newfoundland Safety
Act § 5(b) (requiring employers to provide training where "reasonably practicable"). In
Ontario, an employer must appoint only competent supervisors. Ontario Safety Act
§ 25(c). Manitoba requires training of all employees of construction firms employing
five or more. Manitoba Safety Act § 44(3).
215. See Occupational Health & Safety Act, R.S.A., c.O-2, § 20 (1994) (stating that a
Director may require, by written order, regular inspection for occupational hazards)
[hereinafter Alberta Safety Act]. In Ontario, the joint committee must conduct regular
inspections. Ontario Safety Act §§ 8-9. The size of the investigation committee depends
on the number of employees. See id.
216. See Ontario Safety Act § 26(1)(a). See also Newfoundland Safety Act § 53; Sas-
katchewan Safety Act, pt. II, § 12(1) (providing that ministers may designate a work-
place or class of workers as requiring occupational health services). In Quebec, health
programs are obligatory in designated industries. See Quebec Safety Act, ch. VIII. The
joint committee selects the health services physician who may inspect the workplace and
must visit regularly. See id., ch. VIII, div. III, art. 118, 125.
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Provincial law usually imposes additional duties on supervisors. They
must ensure that workers use protective gear, advise workers of potential
danger, provide written instructions on equipment use, and take reasona-
ble precautions to protect employees. Supervisors may be prosecuted
where they have failed to warn employees of violations.
3. Inspections
Provinces increasingly stress "internal responsibility" as the linchpin
of enforcement. Laws define workplace parties' rights and responsibilities
and rely on joint committees to identify and correct hazards.2 17 As much
as possible, the government limits its own role to intervening when inter-
nal methods fail. While in-house resolution of issues is preferred, exhaus-
tion of internal remedies is not required before government may
intervene.2 18
Inspectors consult, monitor compliance, and investigate fatalities,
work refusals, and hazard complaints. 2 19 Decisions whether to inspect are
discretionary, except for mandatory work refusal investigations.
220
Because provincial government administers both safety and health law and
workers' compensation, it targets inspections using employer-specific
injury and illness information.2 2 1
Inspectors may enter workplaces without warrants or prior notice.
22 2
217. See generally Nova Scotia Safety Act § 2 (detailing principles of internal responsi-
bility system). See also GRossmAN, supra at 190(explaining internal responsibility sys-
tem; noting that participants in British Columbia Regulation Review process
acknowledged need for it); REST & ASHFORD, supra note 194, at 75.
218. Nova Scotia Safety Act § 2(d) (stating that Department of Labour's role is to
assist parties in executing responsibilities and to "intervene appropriately when those
responsibilities are not carried out"). See also LABOUR PRINCIPLE #9: PREVENTION OF
OCcuPAIONAL INJURIEs AND ILLNESSES 5 (draft on file with authors) [hereinafter LABOUR
PRINCIPLE #9].
219. See generally Ontario Safety Act §§ 8(10)-(14), 9(18); Quebec Safety Act, ch. X,
art. 180; Prince Edward Act, pt. II, § 7; New Brunswick Safety Act § 28; Newfoundland
Safety Act §§ 26-31; Alberta Safety Act § 9; Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. XI, § 72; Mani-
toba Safety Act §§ 22-24 (enumerating inspectors' general powers). See also Briefing
Paper, supra note 178, at 4 (describing typical inspection powers in British Columbia);
Ontario Safety Act §§ 8(11)(b), 9(18)(f); REST & ASHFORD, supra note 194, at xiii (listing
field officer consultation powers).
220. See Ontario Safety Act § 43(4)(a)-(c); Manitoba Safety Act § 43(6)-(7). In Que-
bec, the intervention of an inspector may be required after the job-site safety representa-
tive investigates a work refusal and fails to resolve the problem. See Quebec Safety Act,
ch. III, div. I, § 1, art. 18. In Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland, and Alberta, a work
refusal may be referred to an inspector by an employee, if the matter is not resolved by
the joint committee or no committee exists. See Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. I1, §20(9);
Newfoundland Safety Act § 47; Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. IV, § 24.
221. GENERAL AccouNTING OFFICE, supra note 179, at 19-20 tbl.II.4.
222. See Ontario Safety Act § 54(1)(a); Quebec Safety Act, ch. X, art. 179; New Bruns-
wick Safety Act § 28(a); Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. II, § 7(1)(a); Newfoundland Safety
Act § 26(1)(a); Alberta Safety Act § 6; Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. XI, § 72; Manitoba
Safety Act § 24(1)(a). In some provinces, an officer must advise the employer and
employees of its purpose before beginning an inspection. See Quebec Safety Act, ch. X,
art. 187 (stating that before commencing investigation, an inspector must take reasona-
ble steps to advise the employer of inspections); REST & ASHFORD, supra note 194, at 114-
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They may take samples, seize documents or things, and consult with
outside experts and employees. 223 Employee joint committee members
and representatives may accompany inspectors and must be compensated
for time spent with inspectors.2 24 Employer designees may also accom-
pany the inspector.
Inspectors have discretion on how to handle violations. Where a viola-
tion causes death or serious injury, prosecution may be recommended.
Otherwise, inspectors may issue appropriate orders.2 25 Alternatively,
inspectors may take no action. Noncompliance with an order carries no
penalty, but may lead to prosecution. Some, but not all, provinces require
that orders be in writing.2 26 Although issuance of orders is generally dis-
cretionary, a province may have a policy of requiring sanctions when
employees are exposed to certain hazards. Copies of orders must be pro-
vided to joint committees, or posted at the worksite if there is no
committee. 2 27
Inspectors may order equipment shut-down or that employees be
removed from exposure to unabated hazards.2 28 In some provinces,
inspectors may exercise their shut-down authority even if no imminent
danger exists.2 29 In some, inspectors may order abatements. 230 In some,
115 (stating that British Columbia inspectors must present credentials and inform both
the employer and the workers' representative about the nature of the inspection).
223. See generally Ontario Safety Act §§ 54(1), 56; Quebec Safety Act, ch. X, art.
180(3); New Brunswick Safety Act § 28; Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. II, § 7; Newfound-
land Safety Act § 26(b)-(e); Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. XI, § 72(1)(b)-(h); Manitoba
Safety Act § 24(b)-(m) (listing inspectors' powers). See also Alberta Safety Act § 6(1)(b)-(2) (providing that an officer may seize documents subject to certain requirements).
224. See Ontario Safety Act § 54(3), (5); Quebec Safety Act, ch. X, art. 180(7) (stating
that inspectors may be accompanied by persons they select); New Brunswick Safety Act
§ 29; Newfoundland Safety Act § 26(2) (stating that inspectors may compel witnesses to
attend investigations).
225. In Manitoba, for example, officers may issue improvement orders or stop work
orders. See Manitoba Safety Act § 26. See also Ontario Safety Act § 57(1); Quebec Safety
Act, ch. X, art. 182; New Brunswick Safety Act § 32; Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. 11,
§ 8(1); Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. V, §§ 30-33; REST & ASHFORD, supra note 194, at
116-119 (detailing actions inspectors may take against workplace violations).
226. Compare New Brunswick Safety Act § 32(1), and Newfoundland Safety Act
§§ 27-29, and Alberta Safety Act § 7, and Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. V, § 30(1) (stat-
ing that orders must be in writing), with Ontario Safety Act § 57(1), and Quebec Safety
Act, ch. X, art. 182, and Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. II, § 8(1), and Nova Scotia Safety
Act § 55 (authorizing verbal orders). See also REST & ASHFORD, supra note 194, at 115
(discussing verbal orders for minor violations).
227. See Ontario Safety Act § 57(10); Quebec Safety Act, ch. X, art. 183; New Bruns-
wick Safety Act § 35; Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. II, § 8(6); Newfoundland Safety Act
§ 35; Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. V. § 34; Manitoba Safety Act § 28(1). See also REST
& ASHFORD, supra note 194, at 117, n.11 (stating that British Columbia law requires
employers to post reports in conspicuous, accessible places).
228. See generally Ontario Safety Act § 57(6)(a)-(c); Quebec Safety Act, ch. X, art. 186;
New Brunswick Safety Act § 32; Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. II, § 8(4); Newfoundland
Safety Act §§ 27-30; Alberta Safety Act § 9; Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. V. §§ 31-33.
See also Section 74(1) of British Columbia's Workers' Compensation Act, cited in Briefing
Paper, supra note 178, at 4).
229. Compare Newfoundland Safety Act § 27 (requiring immediate danger for stop
work orders), and Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. V, §§ 32-33 (requiring "serious" health
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they may require compliance plans or removal of equipment from service
until tested.2 3 1 Orders are issued without a hearing.
Inspection Procedures 232
Inspection by Joint Safety and Health
Worksite Access Committee
United States Inspector must obtain search warrant if No requirement for joint safety and
employer refuses access. health committees.
Employee representative has right to
accompany inspector.
Canada-Federal Unlimited access. Committees participate in identifying
and inspecting hazards, as well as moni-
toring safety procedures & programs.
Alberta Access at any reasonable hour. Minister may require establishment of
committee to identify unhealthy situa-
tions, make recommendations, or estab-
lish educational programs at any
worksite.
British Unlimited access. Committee must ensure that employer
Columbia is carrying out and will participate in
regular inspections as required by the
safety and health program.
Manitoba Access at any reasonable hour. Committee's duties include participat-
ing in the identification of risks to
safety and health, developing measures
to protect safety, and checking the effec-
tiveness of such measures.
New Brunswick Access at any reasonable hour. Committee may participate in all inves-
tigations or inspections concerning
health and safety.
Newfoundland Access at any reasonable hour. Minister may require establishment of
committee at workplaces with 10 or
more workers. Duties include identify-
ing unsafe aspects of workplace.
Nova Scotia Access at any reasonable hour. Committees participate in inspections
Employer shall give representative, com- and investigations of complaints.
mittee member, or employee the oppor-
tunity to accompany the officer.
risk), and Manitoba Safety Act § 36 (requiring imminent risk of serious physical or
health injuries), with Quebec Safety Act, ch. X, art.186 (allowing shut-down if inspector
"considers a worker's health, safety, or physical well-being to be endangered"), and New
Brunswick Safety Act § 32(1) (providing that if unsafe working conditions may exist, an
inspector can suspend all work), and Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. II, § 8(4) (requiring
only that inspector perceive a danger), and Alberta Safety Act §§ 7-9 (requiring only a
finding of unsafe or unhealthy conditions). In Quebec, the legislature specifically
rejected language limiting shut-down authority to imminent dangers. In British Colum-
bia, shut-down orders are effective for 24 hours. In Ontario, certified joint safety com-
mittee members may shut down operations. See GRossmAN, supra note 190, at §7.11
(detailing functions of certified committee members).
230. See Ontario Safety Act § 57(1); New Brunswick Safety Act § 32(1); Prince
Edward Safety Act, pt. II, § 8(1); Newfoundland Safety Act § 28; Alberta Safety Act §§ 7-
9 (stating that orders must be carried out within times specified).
231. See generally Ontario Safety Act § 57(4), (6)(a); New Brunswick Safety Act § 32;
Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. II, § 4.
232. Portions of this table derived from GErNau. ACCOUNTING OFFcE, supra note 179,
at 19 tbl.lI.4.
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Inspection by Joint Safety and Health
Worksite Access Committee
Ontario Unlimited access. Specific worksite inspections required at
least once a month & cover entire work-
place at least once per year. In absence
of a committee, the safety representative
carries out inspections.
Quebec Unlimited access. No mandatory inspection requirements.
Prince Edward Unlimited access. Committee participates in all inspec-
Island Employer must designate a representa- dons.
tive to accompany the officer, and
afford a committee member the oppor-
tunity to accompany.
Saskatchewan Access at any reasonable hour. Committees participate in the identifica-
tion of health risks and investigate any
work refusals.
Issuance or nonissuance of inspection orders may be administratively
appealed by the employer. 233 However, such appeals do not stay orders
from taking effect.234 Typically, the employer appeals first to the safety
and health division, then to an appointed adjudicator. 235 Adjudicators are
not bound by formal evidence rules and may consider any relevant materi-
als. 236 Appellants are entitled to be notified of hearings, appear with coun-
sel, call witnesses, and receive responsive decisions.237 Adjudications can
typically be appealed to provincial courts, but only on issues of jurisdic-
tion or legal error.2 38 Judicial reversals are rare.2 39
Penalties may lie against any parties, including employees, who violate
the law or regulations, 240 but prosecutions of employees are rare. Federal
prosecutions are also authorized, but are rarely initiated.241 Violations
233. See generally Ontario Safety Act § 61(1); Quebec Safety Act, ch. X, art. 191.1;
Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. II, § 11; Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. VII, § 49(1); Alberta
Safety Act § 11; New Brunswick Safety Act § 37(1); Newfoundland Safety Act § 32; Man-
itoba Safety Act § 37(2).
234. Quebec Safety Act, ch. X, art. 191; New Brunswick Safety Act § 37(2); New-
foundland Safety Act § 34; Alberta Safety Act § 11(7); Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. VIII,
§ 54(1).
235. See generally Ontario Safety Act § 61(1); Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. I1, §§ 11-
12; Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. VIII, §§ 49-51; Manitoba Safety Act § 39. In Quebec, a
tripartite review panel considers challenges to orders or protective reassignments. A
review panel's decision may be appealed to an independent tribunal. Judicial review is
unusual. See CCST, ANNUAL REPORT OF Acrr-nEs, 52-55 (1995); see also Quebec Safety
Act, ch. XVII.
236. See LABOUR PRINCIPLE #9, supra note 218, at 9-10 (describing procedural guaran-
tees for an accuses in an occupational safety and health violation, and noting that
requirements are more formal before a court than before an administrative tribunal). See
also Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. VIII, § 52(3).
237. See, e.g., LABOUR PRINCIPLE #9, supra note 218, at 10. See also Quebec Safety Act,
ch. XVII, div. II-V; Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. VIII, §§ 52-53.
238. See, e.g., Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. VIII, § 56.
239. See, e.g., LABOUR PRINCIPLE #9, supra note 218, at 11.
240. See id. at 6. See also Quebec Safety Act, ch. XIV; Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. VI,
§ 3; Newfoundland Safety Act §§ 67-68; Alberta Safety Act § 32; Saskatchewan Safety
Act, pt. IX, §§ 58-59 (describing penalties).
241. See GROSSMAN, supra note 190, at § 13.1 (noting that occupational safety and
health transgressions are usually addressed under administrative contexts); LABOUR
PRINCIPLE #9, supra note 218, at 6.
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may be prosecuted as "strict liability" offenses, for which criminal proof of
wrongful intent need not be established. 242 Like other criminal breaches,
strict liability violations must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
24 3
Three defenses exist to strict liability offenses. The defense of due
diligence applies when reasonable precautions were taken.244 The defense
of officially induced error applies where an inspector's advice was fol-
lowed, but hazards persisted. 245 Finally, project transition may excuse
noncompliance, such as when scaffolding is dismantled. For requirements
that are applicable only if practicable, the burden of proving impracticabil-
ity falls on the accused.246
Monetary penalties range from Can.$2500 in Manitoba 247 for an indi-
vidual's first offense to Can.$500,000 for corporate violations in Onta-
rio. 248 Jail sentences may also be imposed. 249 Victim surcharges of
twenty percent must be added to penalties above Can.$1000.250 Nova Sco-
tia authorizes non-financial penalties, such as payment for public educa-
tion about hazards, community service, and steps to ensure against repeat
offenses. 251
Quebec, Ontario, and Prince Edward Island assess administrative pen-
alties against individual violators under authority derived from laws other
than safety and health laws.2 52 Moreover, in British Columbia and Price
Edward Island, the Workers' Compensation Board may increase an
employer's workers' compensation assessment to penalize safety and health
violations. 25 3 Such assessments are not fines and may not be appealed.
254
Provinces are also developing alternative compliance programs. For
example, British Columbia's Diamond Project offers firms with excellent
records a choice between partnership with the government and conven-
tional compliance approaches.255 Alberta's Partners in Prevention pro-
gram establishes incentives to reduce workers' compensation costs.
2 56
242. See Regina v. Sault Ste. Marie [1978] 85 D.L.R. (3d) 161 (creating a strict liability
offense for environmental and other regulatory violations).
243. See, e.g., LABOUR PRINCIPLE #9, supra note 218, at 9.
244. See id.
245. See id. (noting that accused may defend her actions by a showing that she estab-
lished a proper system to prevent the commission of the offense). See Quebec Safety Act,
ch. XIV, art. 240 (stating that a worker may defend by showing that an offense was
committed as a result of formal instructions given by an employer).
246. See Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. IX, § 62.
247. See Manitoba Safety Act § 55(2).
248. See, e.g., LABOUR PRINCIPLE #9, supra note 218, at 6.
249. See id. (noting a possible maximum individual penalty of 12 months prison).
See also Quebec Safety Act, ch. XIV, art. 236-7; Newfoundland Safety Act § 67 (describ-
ing jail sentences).
250. See GILBERT & HECKMAN, supra note 189.
251. See Nova Scotia Safety Act § 75.
252. See, e.g., Briefing Paper, supra note 178, at 5. Nova Scotia law authorizes admin-
istrative penalties, but no regulations implementing this requirement have been pub-
lished. See id.
253. See REs-r & AsH oRn, supra note 194, at xv, 122.
254. See id.
255. See id. at xvi, 130.
256. See LABOUR PRINCIPLE #9, supra note 218, at 5 n. 6.
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Shutdown Authority Administrative Penalties Criminal Penalties
United States Department of Labor Must be assessed for all Fines of up to $10,000
must obtain a court order serious, willful, or repeat and/or six months
to halt operations in case violations. Fines of up to imprisonment If violation
of imminent danger. $7000 for non-willful vio- of standard is willful and
lations and up to $70,000 results in death of a
for willful or repeat viola- worker or employer
tions, minimum of $5000 makes false statements in
per willful violation, reports filed; up to $1000
and six months imprison-
ment for giving advance
notice of inspection..
Canada- Officer has the authority None. 1-For violation of an
Federal to shut down any place, order by a safety and
thing, or machine consist- health officer not more
ing of a danger if that than $25,000.
danger cannot otherwise 2-For an employer's fall-
be guarded or protected ure to post the names of
against immediately. the safety & health reps.
or failure to post officer's
notices: not more than
$5000.
3-For a violation of any
section respecting hazard-
ous materials:
a-fine up to $100,000
and/or up to six months
in prison.
b-if convicted on indict-
ment, a fine not more
than $1,000,000 and/or
up to two years imprison-
ment.
4-For a violation resulting
in death or injury is lia-
ble to a fine not exceed-
ing $100,000.
Alberta Officer has the authority None. First offense: not more
to shut down any place, than $50,000 & not more
tool, appliance, or equip- than $10,000 for each
ment deemed to be a dan- day the offense continues.
ger or health hazard. Second offense: not more
than $300,000 & not
more than $20,000 for
each day the offense con-
tinues.
Not withstanding the pre-
vious fines, a person who
fails to comply with a
stop work order can be
fined up to $300,000 or
imprisoned for up to
twelve months or both.
A person who knowingly
makes a false statement
or knowingly gives false
information to an officer
engaged in an inspection
investigation is subject to
a fine of not more than
$500 or imprisonment for
six months or both.
257. Portions of this table derived from GENERAL ACCOUNTING OMCE, supra note 179,
at 21 tbl.HI.5.
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Shutdown Authority Administrative Penalties Criminal Penalties
British Inspector has authority to Fine of $1500-$30,000 for Fines of up to $1000 for
Columbia shut down for a 24-hour each violation depending violation of health and
period any place, equip- on type of violation & safety regulation, up to
ment, machine, device, size of payroll. $5000 and/or three
article, thing or process Repeat/Multiple violations months' imprisonment for
deemed to be a danger or can lead to penalties in violations that cause an
health hazard, excess of $30,000 with no injury to or death of a
Board may extend the maximum, worker.
order. Fines of up to $50,000
and/or six months'
imprisonment for violat-
ing an inspector's closure
order.
Manitoba Officer has the authority None. For failure to carry out
to shut down any place or required duties, violation
activities likely to involve of regulations or continu-
an imminent risk of seri- ation of stop work and
ous physical or health important orders: $5000,
injury, plus $2500 for each day
offense continues (first
offense); for second
offense, $3000 and $5000
for each day.
Additional penalties:
1-where a person is con-
victed for an offense
under the Act, he may be
imprisoned for six
months.
2-A person convicted of
permitting a worker to
perform an unusually
dangerous task may not
work in a supervisory
capacity for six months.
For a violation of any
other provision of the Act:
fine not exceeding $2500.
New Brunswick Officer has the authority None. None listed in statute.
to shut down any place,
tool, equipment machine,
or device deemed to be
unsafe or unhealthy.
Newfoundland Assistant Deputy Minister None. Fines not exceeding
or officer has authority to $50,000 and/or imprison-
shut down any place, ment for up to six
tool, appliance or equip- months and up to $5000
ment posing an immedi- a day for each day the
ate risk to health & violation continues.
safety.
Nova Scotia Officer has authority to None. Fines up to $250,000
shut down any place, and/or two years in
device, equipment, prison or both. The court
machine, material, or may impose an additional
thing deemed to be a $25,000 for each day the
source of danger or offense continues. Addi-
health hazard. tionally, the court can
impose non-financial pen-
alties, such as community
service and developing
procedures for prevention
of violations.
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Shutdown Authority Administrative Penalties Criminal Penalties
Ontario Inspector has the author- Construction: maximum Maximum penalty for an
ity to shut down any fine of $300 for employ- individual is $25,000
place, equipment, ers and employees, and/or up to one year
machine, device, article, Manufacturing or Mining: imprisonment.
thing, or process deemed none. Maximum penalty for a
to be a danger or health corporation is $500,000.
hazard.
Quebec Inspector has the author- Fine of $500-$ 1000 for No criminal penalties pro-
ity to shut down any worker or employer and vided by law.
place, equipment, $5000-$20,000 for a com-
machine, device, article, pany.
thing, or process deemed Repeat offenses increase
to be a danger or health fines to $1000-$2000 for
hazard, an individual and
$10,000-$50,000 for a
company.
Prince Edward Officer has the authority Information not available. Fines of not more than
Island to shut down any place, $50,000 or one month
equipment, machine, imprisonment or both.
device, article, or thing Additionally, the court
deemed to be a danger or may impose a fine of
health hazard. $5000 for each day the
offense continues.
Officer has the authority
to require cessation of
any work violating the
Act or regulations if the
work involves a serious
risk to health or safety.
None.
.1. ____________ .1.
1-For intentionally
obstructing an occupa-
tional safety & health
officer, intentionally mak-
ing a false entry in any
register or document, or
failure to comply with an
order: fine not exceeding
$2000.
2-For failure to comply
with an order of a Direc-
tor or Adjudicator: maxi-
mum fine of $5000 for
each day the offense con-
tinues.
3-For failure to comply
with any requirement or
notice, taking discrimina-
tory actions against an
employee, or contravening
any other provisions of
the Act: up to $10,000,
plus $1000 for each day
the offense continues
(first offense); for second
offense, up to $20,000,
plus $2000 for each day
offense continues.
4-If offense is likely to
cause serious injury or
death: up to $50,000 &
$5000 per day (first
offense); for second
offense, up to $100,000
and $10,000 per day.
5-For any offense causing
death or serious injury:
up to $300,000 and pos-
sible imprisonment up to
two years.
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4. Joint Committees
Joint committees are a signal feature of Canada's workplace health and
safety policy. 258 Composed of employer and employee representatives,
joint committees are charged with promoting health and safety in the work-
place. Some provinces mandate joint committees for all workplaces meet-
ing designated criteria, whereas others mandate committee formation only
in designated workplaces.
The structure, operation, and responsibilities of joint committees in all
provinces are broadly similar. Typically, at least half the members must be
employee representatives. Joint committee size varies by province and with
the size of the enterprise. Employee representatives must be selected by a
union (where one exists) or elected by co-workers. They must meet on a
regular basis and keep minutes.
The functions and powers of joint committees include identifying
hazards, advising employers, assisting inspectors, resolving disputes, aid-
ing injured or endangered employees, and fostering training and compli-
ance. These rights and responsibilities vary in detail by province. Several
provinces itemize committee rights and functions, while others promulgate
only general requirements.
For workplaces not required to have joint committees, several prov-
inces mandate that health and safety representatives be selected by workers
or appointed by unions. These representatives exercise functions, rights,
powers, and duties comparable to those of joint committees. In some prov-
inces, committee members also may be authorized to function indepen-
dently as representatives, aside from their rights as committee members.
Although joint committees investigate and advise employers with lim-
ited decision making powers, they may promote health and safety in sev-
eral key ways: by inducing employee-management cooperation, by giving
employees a voice and forum for registering their knowledge and concerns,
and by promoting union attention to and possible collective bargaining on
health and safety issues. 25 9
Many provinces require that employee members be paid for time spent
258. Committees are required, depending on the number of workers employed, in
Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Nova Scotia. See Onta-
rio Safety Act §§ 8-9; Quebec Safety Act, ch. XVI, art. 327; New Brunswick Safety Act
§ 14; Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. III, §§ 15-16; Manitoba Safety Act § 40; Nova Scotia
Safety Act § 29 (requiring committees and explaining their formation). See also Prince
Edward Safety Act, pt. III, § 18(1) (stating that even if employers and employees have not
agreed to a joint committee, Board may still require one); Newfoundland Safety Act
§ 37(stating that "the minister may order establishment of committees at workplaces
where 10 or more workers are employed"); Alberta Safety Act § 25 (providing that Minis-
ter may require committee by order).
259. See Quebec Safety Act, ch. VIII, div. III, art. 118 (stating that the health and
safety committee shall choose the occupational physician); Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt.
III, § 19(e) (requiring investigation of work refusals). See generally New Brunswick
Safety Act § 15; Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. III, § 18(6); Newfoundland Safety Act § 39
(giving committees broad investigatory powers and duties).
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on joint committee work.26 0 However, provinces usually do not specify:
electoral and appointment procedures; terms of office; rules of protocol;
subcommittee structures; degree of control over members by employers,
employees, and unions; and the means of resolving contentious issues.
These areas may be addressed by regulation, but are otherwise resolved by
particular workplaces and committees or by collective bargaining. In addi-
tion, several provinces mandate employer cooperation with joint committee
work and forbid discrimination against employees executing health and
safety duties.261
Summary of Joint Committee Requirements in Canada262
Duty to
Number of Number of Duty to perform
employees JHSC perform Required accident Duty to
Mandatory forJHSCs to members workplace frequency of investiga- ensure train-
JHSCs be required required inspections meetings tions ing
Canada Yes 20 2 Yes Once a Yes No
Federal (Min.) month
Alberta No N/A 3-12 Yes Once a No No
(not month
mandatory
in all work-
places)
British Yes 20-50 4 Yes Once a Yes No
Columbia (Min.) month
Manitoba Yes 20 4-12 Yes Every 3 No Yes
(except con- months (or
struction) monthly if
required by
Director)
260. See Ontario Safety Act § 8(15); New Brunswick Safety Act § 14(7); Prince
Edward Safety Act, pt. III, § 18(8). See also Newfoundland Safety Act § 40 (stating that
workers are not to suffer pay loss while engaged in committee meetings).
261. See Manitoba Safety Act § 4(e) (requiring employer cooperation with joint com-
mittee or health and safety representative), § 32(1) (prohibiting discrimination against
employees seeking to enforce the Act or execute duties under it); New Brunswick Safety
Act § 9(2)(e) (requiring employer cooperation with joint committee or representative),
§ 24 (prohibiting discrimination against employees seeking to enforce the Act or execute
duties under it); Nova Scotia Safety Act § 13(2)(a) (requiring employer cooperation with
joint committee or representative), § 45 (prohibiting discrimination against employees
seeking to enforce the Act or execute duties under it); Ontario Safety Act § 25(2)(e)
(requiring employers to cooperate with joint committee or representative), § 50 (prohib-
iting discrimination against employees seeking to enforce the Act or execute duties
under it); Prince Edward Safety Act § 13(2)(e) (requiring employer cooperation with
joint committee or representative), § 22 (prohibiting discrimination against employees
seeking to enforce the Act or execute duties under it); Quebec Safety Act § 51(14)
(requiring employer cooperation with joint committee or "person responsible for the
application of this act"), § 31(97) (prohibiting discrimination against representatives
executing duties under the Act); Saskatchewan Safety Act § 3(b) (requiring employer
cooperation with joint committee or representative), § 27 (prohibiting discrimination
against employees seeking to enforce the Act or execute duties under it).
262. Briefing Paper, supra note 179, at tbl.3.
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Duty to
Number of Number of Duty to perform
employees JHSC perform Required accident Duty to
Mandatory for JHSCs to members workplace frequency of investiga- ensure train-
JHSCs be required required inspections meetings tions ing
New Yes 20 N/A No Once a No Yes
Brunswick (Committee month (jHSC may (Employer
may under- (except for undertake must grant
take these low hazard these activi- leave)
activities) sites) ties)
Newfound No 10 2-12 Yes Once every No No
land (May be 3 months (ButJHSC
required by must have
Minister) access to
results)
Nova Scotia Yes 20 N/A Yes No time line Yes Yes
Ontario Yes 20 2 or 4 Yes Once a Yes Yes
(Min.) month (At least one
depending employer
on size of and one
workplace worker must
be certified)
Prince Edward No N/A N/A No N/A No No
Island (Participa-
tion in Min-
istry of
Labour
inspections)
Quebec Yes 20 3-22 Yes No time line Yes Yes
If establish-
ment is an
industry cat-
egorized as
requiring
committees
Saskatchewan Yes 10 2-12 Yes Every 3 Yes No
months
5. Right to Refuse Dangerous Work
Provincial law provides strong protection for the right to refuse dan-
gerous work. Employees who properly exercise this right are protected
from employer discharge, discipline, or discrimination. Generally, an
employee may refuse work provided there are reasonable grounds for con-
sidering the work dangerous. In most provinces, employees may exercise
the right to refuse when an unusual danger is present, even if no imminent
risk exists. 263 However, the employee right may not be exercised to the
danger of other workers. In some provinces, employees also may refuse
work that endangers others.264  Unionized workers exercise the right to
263. See generally Quebec Safety Act, ch. III, div. I, § 2, art. 12; New Brunswick Safety
Act §§ 19-23; Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. III, §§ 20-21; Newfoundland Safety Act
§§ 45(1), 48; Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. IV, § 23; Manitoba Safety Act § 43 (stating
that workers must have reasonable grounds to refuse work). See also Ontario Safety Act
§ 43 (3)(a)-(c) (stating that a worker must have reason to believe that work will "likely"
endanger herself or another worker). But see Alberta Safety Act § 27 (requiring exis-
tence of imminent danger before right of refusal may be exercised).
264. See Ontario Safety Act § 43(3)(a)-(c); Quebec Safety Act, ch. III, div. I, § 2, art.
12; New Brunswick Safety Act § 19; Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. III, § 20(1); New-
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refuse work more than non-union workers.
A work refusal is followed by inquiry into the seriousness of the
asserted danger. 265 The objective is abatement of serious dangers so work
may resume. The employer or a supervisor has initial responsibility to
decide whether a hazard requires abatement. No employer judgement is
final if it orders back to work an employee with unalleviated apprehen-
sions. If the employer takes no abatement action, the joint committee or
the health and safety representative investigates. The joint committee,
health and safety representative, or a government inspector may judge the
situation safe and advise resumption of work. Once work resumption has
been authorized, continued refusal may subject an employee to discharge
or other discipline. Government inspectors normally have final authority.
However, employees discharged or disciplined for continued work refusal
may seek judicial review. Because an employee's work refusal is protected,
wages and benefits must be maintained until the matter is resolved. 266
Usually, employees may not be assigned work refused by others as
dangerous, although in some provinces they may be so assigned if they are
notified of the refusal, the reasons for it, and their own right of refusal.267
In other provinces, whether another employee may be assigned refused
work turns on whether a danger exists or not.2 68 If there is real, unabated
danger, the work cannot be performed, even with employee notice and
employee choice.
Employees who complain of discipline for reporting safety violations,
refusing dangerous work, or exercising other health and safety rights may
generally initiate grievance procedures. 269 Employees must first exhaust
any arbitral remedies specified in a collective bargaining agreement. In the
foundland Safety Act § 45(1); Alberta Safety Act § 27(b) ("imminent" danger); Saskatch-
ewan Safety Act, pt. IV, § 23; Manitoba Safety Act § 43.
265. See generally Ontario Safety Act §§ 43-49; Quebec Safety Act, ch. III, div. 1, § 2;
Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. III, §§ 20-23.
266. See Ontario Safety Act § 43(13); New Brunswick Safety Act §§ 22-23; Newfound-
land Safety Act § 45. See also Quebec Safety Act, ch. III, div. I, § 2, art. 19 (stating that
an inspector's decision governs when an employee returns to work); Prince Edward
Safety Act, pt. Il, § 21 (listing when an employees' right to refuse work is protected).
267. See Ontario Safety Act § 43(11) (requiring only that the employee be notified of
the former employee's refusal and the reasons for it, but not that the employee be noti-
fied of his own right of refusal); Quebec Safety Act, ch. III, div. I, § 2, art. 17 (requiring
only that the employee be notified of the former employee's refusal and the reasons for
it, but not that the employee be notified of his own right of refusal); New Brunswick
Safety Act § 21(2); Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. III, § 21(2); Saskatchewan Safety Act,
pt. IV, § 26; Alberta Safety Act § 27(4) (stating that a worker cannot be assigned to do
the work previously refused unless (i) the new worker will not be exposed to imminent
danger or (ii) the imminent danger has been eliminated).
268. Quebec Safety Act, ch. III, div. I, § 2, art. 17 (stating that the safety representa-
tive must believe there is no danger, but that replacement employee must still be
informed of previous refusal to work); Alberta Safety Act § 27(4)(b) (providing that no
reassignment shall occur unless imminent danger has been eliminated).
269. See generally Ontario Safety Act § 50; Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. III, § 23;
Newfoundland Safety Act § 51; Alberta Safety Act § 28.1; Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt.
IV, § 28. The British Columbia Act has no prohibition against work reprisal. See Brief-
ing Paper, supra note 178, at 7.
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absence of such remedies, labor tribunals decide whether the employer lev-
ied illegal discipline.270 A rebuttable presumption of illegal discipline
exists when adverse action occurs within a short time after an employee
exercises protected rights.271 If illegal discipline is found, the employer
may be ordered to reinstate the employee, cancel or stay any penalties or
reprisals and records of them, and pay wages or benefits withheld.272
Right to Refuse Work 27 3
Investigation of Presumption if
Scope of Right Effect on Pay Claim Retaliation Occurs
United States Right to refuse No right to be Investigated by OSHA must bring
when faced with paid while refus- OSHA. claim and bears
imminent danger ing to work burden of proof.
that cannot be cor-
rected through
inspection.
Canada-Federal Right to refuse Statute silent. Immediate investi- Burden on
work reasonably gation by employer employer to prove
believed to be dan- in presence of action not discrim-
gerous unless such worker and at inatory.
danger is a normal least one member
part of job or of the safety and
refusal would health committee,
endanger the life, if any exists. If
health, or safety of matter is not
another, resolved to
employee's satis-
faction, the
employee shall
notify a safety
officer.
Alberta Right to refuse Must be paid until Employer must A worker who has
work when an hazard is abated, investigate and reasonable cause
imminent danger eliminate the haz- to believe that she
exists, unless such ard; if employee has been dis-
a danger is a nor- feels danger still missed or subject
mal part of job. exists, may com- to disciplinary
plain to an officer, action may file a
complaint with an
officer.
British Right to refuse Must be paid until Immediate investi- Burden of proof
Columbia work believed to hazard is abated. gation by employer on employer to
be dangerous, in presence of prove actions not
unless such dan- worker and mem- discriminatory.
ger is a normal her of the commit-
part of the job or tee. If not
refusal would resolved, worker
endanger the life, must immediately
health, or safety or notify an officer.
another.
270. See, e.g., Ontario Safety Act § 50(2)-(7); LABOUR PRINCIPLE #9, supra note 218, at
7; GILBERT & HECKIAN, supra note 189, at n.254.
271. See Ontario Safety Act § 50(5); Quebec Safety Act, Ch. III, div. I, §2, art. 30;
Newfoundland Safety Act § 50; Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. IV, § 28(4).
272. See Prince Edward Safety Act, pt. Ill, § 23(4); Newfoundland Safety Act § 52;
Alberta Safety Act § 28.1(4); Saskatchewan Safety Act, pt. IV, § 29.
273. Table compiled by authors.
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Investigation of Presumption if
Scope of Right Effect on Pay Claim Retaliation Occurs
Manitoba Right to refuse Must be paid until Immediate investi- Burden of proof
work reasonably hazard is abated gation by employer on employer to
believed to endan- or matter is in presence of prove actions not
ger health and resolved, worker and mem- discriminatory.
safety. ber of the commit-
tee. If not
resolved, worker
must immediately
notify an officer.
New Brunswick Right to refuse Must be paid until Immediate investi- If employee feels
work reasonably hazard is abated gation by supervi- discriminatory
believed to be dan- or matter is sor. If the matter action has been
gerous to health resolved, is not resolved to taken, employee
and safety. employee's satis- may have the mat-
faction, the matter ter dealt with by
is referred to a arbitration or file
committee or a complaint with
officer, commission.
Newfoundland Right to refuse Must be paid until Immediate investi- Burden on
work reasonably hazard is abated gation by supervi- employer to prove
believed to endan- or matter is sor. If the matter actions not dis-
ger health or resolved, is not resolved to criminatory.
safety. employee's satis-
faction, report it to
officer.
Nova Scotia Right to refuse Must be paid until Immediate investi- Burden on
work reasonably hazard is abated gation by supervi- employer to prove
believed to be dan- or matter is sor. If the matter actions not dis-
gerous to health resolved, is not resolved to criminatory.
and safety, unless employee's satis-
such danger is a faction, report to
normal part of job committee or rep-
or refusal endan- resentative.
gers life of
another.
Ontario Right to refuse Must be paid until Inspector investi- Burden of proof
work believed dan- hazard is abated, gates refusal in the on employer.
gerous, unless presence of the
such danger is a employer or her
normal part of job representative, the
or refusal would worker and a com-
endanger the life, mittee member.
health or safety of
another.
Quebec Right to refuse Must be paid until Safety representa- No employer may
work believed to hazard is abated. tive must be noti- dismiss, suspend
be dangerous, fled and examine or transfer a
unless such dan- the claim; inter- worker who has
ger is a normal vention of inspec- exercised the right
part of job or tor may be to refuse. How-
refusal would required if refusal ever, employer
endanger the life, continues or if may, within 10
health or safety of employer requests. days following an
another. inspector's deci-
sion, dismiss a
worker who has
abused this right.
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Investigation of Presumption if
Scope of Right Effect on Pay Claim Retaliation Occurs
Prince Edward Right to refuse Must be paid until Immediate investi- If employer feels
Island work reasonably hazard is abated gation by supervi- discriminatory
believed to endan- or matter is sor. If the matter action has been
ger health and resolved. However, is not resolved to taken, he may
safety. if it is determined the satisfaction of have the matter
that the refusal the employee, he dealt with by arbi-
was frivolous, the may report the tration or file a
employee shall not matter to an complaint with the
be entitled to officer. Board.
wages and bene-
fits.
Saskatchewan Right to refuse Statute silent. Immediate investi- Burden on
work believed to gation by commit- employer to prove
be unusually dan- tee. If no actions not dis-
gerous to health committee or criminatory.
and safety. worker not satis-
fied, the worker
may request an
investigation by an
officer.
D. Information Systems
Because provinces administer both safety and health laws and work-
ers' compensation programs, government inspectors have access to com-
prehensive information, including accident and injury reports and
investigation reports filed by employers.27 4 In most provinces, inspectors
receive employer reports of injuries and potentially injurious incidents,
e.g., near misses, explosions, fires, and chemical releases. 275 In addition,
inspectors may access information from local law enforcement investiga-
tions of reported fatalities.2 76 Finally, several provinces require owners,
contractors, and employers to provide inspectors advance notice of hazard-
ous activities, like construction, trench excavation, tunneling, and asbestos
projects.2 77 Joint committees and health and safety representatives also
have access to information available to inspectors.
E. Training
Employers are typically required to train employees on health and
safety. 278 Training obligations generally apply when an employee begins
work and when job duties change. Employers may also be required to
ensure competent supervision. This implies that supervisors must also be
274. See REST & ASHFORD, supra note 194, at 100-107, Table 5.1. See Quebec Safety
Act, ch. X, art. 179; New Brunswick Safety Act § 15(j); Newfoundland Safety Act § 26(b)
(granting inspectors access to employer records "that relate to the health and safety of
workers").
275. See generally Ontario Safety Act §§ 51-53; Quebec Safety Act, ch. III, div. II, § 4,
art. 62; Newfoundland Safety Act § 54 (detailing steps for reporting accidents).
276. See, e.g., LABOUR PRINCIPLE #9, supra note 218, at 8.
277. See, e.g., Quebec Safety Act, ch. III, div. II, § 2, art. 52 (providing that employers
must register risks associated with employment).
278. See, e.g., Ontario Safety Act § 25(2)(a); Quebec Safety Act, ch. III, div. II, § 2, art.
51(9); New Brunswick Safety Act § 9(2)(c); Manitoba Safety Act § 4(2)(b).
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trained.279 Many provinces fund such training.280 Some provinces also
require special training for joint committee members. For instance, Sas-
katchewan requires that committee members receive five days training;28 1
Manitoba requires two.2 82 Ontario requires that one management and one
labor committee member be certified as trained.283
F. Workers' Compensation
Each Canadian province has enacted workers' compensation laws.
Injured or ill workers receive medical care and wage replacement benefits
and, in fatality cases, dependents receive survivor's benefits. Coverage is
no-fault. Claimants need not prove employer negligence, but only injury or
illness arising within the scope of their employment.284 Where it applies,
workers' compensation is exclusive, meaning that covered employers are
immunized from tort liability for workplace injuries.285 Unlike tort suits,
workers' compensation typically does not provide non-economic damages
such as pain and suffering or emotional distress. Ontario, however, is an
exception, and provides standardized non-economic compensation in
cases of permanent impairment.286
For computing assessments, employers are grouped into industries
and categories, based mainly on injury levels.2 8 7 Premiums may vary fur-
ther for employers with especially poor or excellent safety records.288
279. See, e.g., Ontario Safety Act § 25(2)(c); New Brunswick Safety Act § 9(2)(c).
280. See generally Canadian Auto Workers, Submission to Royal Commission on
Workers' Compensation in British Columbia (July 3-5, 1997).
281. See Saskatchewan Safety Regulations § 46.
282. See Manitoba Safety Act § 44.
283. See Ontario Safety Act § 9(12).
284. See Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.N.S., ch. 10, § 10 (1994) [hereinafter Nova
Scotia Compensation Act]; Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.P.E.I., cfi. W-7, § 6(1)
(1995) [hereinafter Prince Edward Island Compensation Act]; Workers' Insurance Act,
R.S.O, ch. W.11, § (1) (1994) [hereinafter Ontario Insurance Act]; Workers Compensa-
tion Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 492, § 5(1) (1995) [hereinafter British Columbia Compensation
Act]; Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.A., ch. W-16. § 19(4) (1996) [hereinafter Alberta
Compensation Act]; The Worker's Compensation Act, 1979, S.S., ch. W-17.1, §§ 28-9
[hereinafter Saskatchewan Compensation Act]; Worker's Compensation Act, R.S.N.B.,
ch. W-13, §§ 7, 85 (1996) [hereinafter New Brunswick Compensation Act].
285. See, e.g., Prince Edward Island Compensation Act § 13(1); British Columbia
Compensation Act § 10; Alberta Compensation Act § 16(2); Saskatchewan Compensa-
tion Act § 167; Workers Compensation Act, R.S.M., ch. W200, § 13 (1993) [hereinafter
Manitoba Compensation Act].
286. See Ontario Insurance Act § 46.
287. Procedures for calculating premiums vary within each province. See generally
Nova Scotia Compensation Act §§ 100-06; Workmen's Compensation Act, R.S.Q., ch. A-
3, § 95 [hereinafter Quebec Compensation Act]; Prince Edward Island Compensation
Act §§ 59-63; British Columbia Compensation Act §§ 39-40; Alberta Compensation Act
§§ 96-105; Saskatchewan Compensation Act § 135; An Act Respecting Compensation to
Workers for Injuries Suffered in the Course of Their Employment, Nfld. R.S., ch. W-1 1,
§ 97-108 (1994) [hereinafter Newfoundland Compensation Act]; Manitoba Compensa-
tion Act §§ 80-81.
288. See Prince Edward Island Compensation Act 63; Nova Scotia Compensation Act
§ 99(2); Quebec Compensation Act § 84(4); Ontario Insurance Act § 83; British Colum-
bia Compensation Act § 42; Alberta Compensation Act § 110; Saskatchewan Compen-
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Varying a firm's assessment according to its safety pe'rformance creates a
link between workers' compensation cost and safety and health perform-
ance. At least one province tightens that link by specifying compliance
with health and safety regulations as an explicit criterion for individualized
assessments.2
89
The central institutions in each province are a fund (Fund) from which
payments are drawn and a board or commission (Board) for administering
it.29 ° Curiously, Quebec excludes some covered employers from the Fund
system, leaving them individually responsible for workers' compensation
payments. 291 Fund systems are financed by periodic assessments upon
covered employers at amounts established by the Board to support Fund
obligations.292 Private insurers play no role. In this respect, Canada's
workers' compensation system differs significantly from the prevailing U.S.
model. Typically, the provincial Board is empowered to invest Fund mon-
ies and to borrow to generate additional assets.293 Often, Fund monies
support provincial safety and health activities. The Board also establishes
compensation eligibility and benefit levels.29 4 Usually, a specialized tribu-
nal has authority to review Board decisions.295 Appeals to the court sys-
tem are restricted.296
Most provinces cover work-related injuries even when they stem from
willful misconduct by the employer or a co-employee. To minimize rewards
for bad behavior, most provinces provide no coverage where a worker's
sation Act § 138; Newfoundland Compensation Act § 95(2); Manitoba Compensation
Act § 82(2)(3).
289. See Prince Edward Island Compensation Act § 74(4).
290. See, e.g., Prince Edward Island Compensation Act § 6(1); Manitoba Compensa-
tion Act § 4(1); British Columbia Compensation Act § 5(1); Alberta Compensation Act
§§ 19(1), 85; Saskatchewan Compensation Act § 28; Newfoundland Compensation Act
§§ 5, 93. See also Workplace Health, Safety & Compensation Commission Act, S.N.B.,
ch. W-14 (1994) [hereinafter New Brunswick Workplace Commission Act] (detailing
procedures of the Commission).
291. See Quebec Compensation Act § 3(3).
292. See Nova Scotia Compensation Act § 100(2); Prince Edward Island Compensa-
tion Act § 63; British Columbia Compensation Act §§ 39-40; Alberta Compensation Act
§§ 91-97; Saskatchewan Compensation Act § 135; Newfoundland Safety Act § 97-8.
293. See British Columbia Compensation Act § 67(2) (stating that Board must invest
funds subject to direction of Minister of Finance); Alberta Compensation Act § 86; Sas-
katchewan Compensation Act §§ 120, 151; New Brunswick Workplace Commission Act
§ 24; Newfoundland Compensation Act § 10; Manitoba Compensation Act § 97.
294. See, e.g., Nova Scotia Compensation Act § 148, 150; Prince Edward Island Com-
pensation Act 22 19-31, 32(2)(3); British Columbia Compensation Act § 96(1); Alberta
Compensation Act § 3.1; Saskatchewan Compensation Act § 117; Newfoundland Com-
pensation Act § 5.
295. See Nova Scotia Compensation Act § 176-178; Prince Edward Island Compensa-
tion Act § 56; Alberta Compensation Act § 8(1); New Brunswick Workplace Commis-
sion Act § 20; Newfoundland Compensation Act § 21; Manitoba Compensation Act
§ 60.2-60.8.
296. See Prince Edward Island Compensation Act § 32(1), 32(4); Ontario Insurance
Act § 26-31; Nova Scotia Compensation Act § 183; British Columbia Compensation Act
§§ 85, 90-91, 96; Alberta Compensation Act § 7-8; New Brunswick Workplace Com-
mission Act § 21-23; Newfoundland Compensation Act 22 26-36. See also Saskatche-
wan Compensation Act § 166 (abolishing all court actions).
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serious fault causes self-inflicted minor injury.297 Workers' compensation
nevertheless applies in cases of death or serious impairment regardless of
employee fault. 298
Most provinces exclude certain employers and employees from work-
ers' compensation. 299 The particular exclusions vary by province, and
there are no stated statutory criteria. Common categories of excluded
employees are casual workers, outworkers, farm workers, domestics, and
municipal employees. 300 Excluded employers are not subject to Fund
assessments. Injuries to excluded employees or at excluded enterprises are
not compensated from the Fund.
All employers who contribute to the Fund are immunized from tort
liability arising from job injuries or illnesses of covered employees. Most
provinces, however, allow tort suits against parties other than the claim-
ant's employer.30 1 Such third-party suits lie, for example, against makers
of defective products causing injury. Moreover, in several provinces, claim-
ants who receive tort damages below what workers' compensation would
have provided are entitled to recover the shortfall from workers'
compensation.302
The Fund may recoup any workers' compensation payments made
from judgments workers receive in third-party suits. It may also sue third
parties in place of the claimant, transferring to the claimant damages above
what it keeps to recoup its expenses and any workers' compensation bene-
fits paid.303
297. See British Columbia Compensation Act § 5(3); Alberta Compensation Act
§ 19(1)(a); Saskatchewan Compensation Act § 31. There is some variation in this exclu-
sion. Manitoba and Prince Edward Island impose only a three-week waiting period. See
Manitoba Compensation Act § 4(3); Prince Edward Island Compensation Act § 6(3)(a).
New Brunswick bars benefits for injuries stemming from intoxication. See New Bruns-
wick Compensation Act § 7(1).
298. See, e.g., Newfoundland Compensation Act § 34; British Columbia Compensa-
tion Act § 5(3); Alberta Compensation Act § 19(2); Saskatchewan Compensation Act
§ 31.
299. See Quebec Compensation Act § 7; Nova Scotia Compensation Act §§ 4-8;
Prince Edward Island Compensation Act § 2(1)-(3); Saskatchewan Compensation Act
§ 10. See also British Columbia Compensation Act § 2; Alberta Compensation Act
§ 9(1); Newfoundland Compensation Act § 38 (all applying Acts to employers and work-
ers unless exempted in regulations).
300. See Nova Scotia Compensation Act § 4(2); Saskatchewan Compensation Act
§ 10(a)-(e); Manitoba Compensation Act § 3 (excluding farm laborers).
301. See, e.g., Nova Scotia Compensation Act § 17; British Columbia Compensation
Act § 10(2); Alberta Compensation Act § 17(1); Saskatchewan Compensation Act § 39;
Newfoundland Compensation Act § 45(1); Prince Edward Island Compensation Act
§ 11(1); Quebec Compensation Act § 7(1).
302. See, e.g., Nova Scotia Compensation Act § 17; Quebec Compensation Act § 7(2);
Prince Edward Island Compensation Act § 11(3); British Columbia Compensation Act
§ 10(5); New Brunswick Compensation Act §10(8).
303. See, e.g., Prince Edward Island Compensation Act § 11(3)-(4); New Brunswick
Compensation Act § 10(10)-(12); Ontario Insurance Act § 30(12); Alberta Compensa-
tion Act § 17(5)(d); Saskatchewan Compensation Act §§ 40, 41(2); Newfoundland
Compensation Act § 45(10).
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In most provinces, tort claimants recover only those damages attribu-
table to third-party defendants, not those damages attributable to their
own employer. For deterrence and equity, the Fund may attribute injuries
wholly or partly to the third-party and assess Fund charges accordingly. 30 4
Precluding recovery of damages attributable to employers protects tort
immunity under workers' compensation, and prevents cost-shifting to
other parties except (implicitly) the claimant.
Several provinces superfluously authorize workplace tort suits against
employers excluded from workers' compensation. 30 5 Employers generally
may not claim the defenses of assumption of risk or the fellow servant
rule.30 6 Contributory negligence also does not apply to defeat liability, but
may be considered to reduce damages.30 7
Full medical and rehabilitation expenses lie for all job-related injuries
and job-caused diseases.308 Compensation also goes to surviving depen-
dents for occupational fatalities. Dependent survivor benefits vary by
province and, within any given province, they are gauged to the circum-
stances and relationships with the deceased.30 9
All provinces indemnify income loss. 31 0 Indemnity equals a fixed per-
centage of lost income or lost earning capacity.311 The percentage varies
among provinces and changes over time. Some provinces specify limits on
income loss indemnities. These limits may be on the minimum amount of
304. See, e.g., Ontario Insurance Act § 29; Alberta Compensation Act § 18(2); Prince
Edward Island Compensation Act §§ 12(2), 63(5)-(6); New Brunswick Compensation
Act § 11; Nova Scotia Compensation Act § 18; Saskatchewan Compensation Act §§ 39-
41; Manitoba Compensation Act § 9; British Columbia Compensation Act § 10(7)-(8).
305. See Nova Scotia Compensation Act § 188; Prince Edward Island Compensation
Act § 88(1); British Columbia Compensation Act § 103(1); Manitoba Compensation Act
§§ 110-13.
306. See Prince Edward Island Compensation Act §§ 88(4), 89; Nova Scotia Compen-
sation Act §§ 188(4)-189; British Columbia Compensation Act § 103(4).
307. See Prince Edward Island Compensation Act § 90; Nova Scotia Compensation
Act § 190. See also British Columbia Compensation Act § 105; Manitoba Compensation
Act § 113.
308. See, e.g., Nova Scotia Compensation Act §§ 71-73, 84; Quebec Compensation
Act §§ 53, 56, 111; Prince Edward Island Compensation Act §§ 18, 84; British Colum-
bia Compensation Act §§ 5(1), 6, 21; Alberta Compensation Act §§ 19(1), 73-81; Sas-
katchewan Compensation Act §§ 32, 106-115; Newfoundland Compensation Act §§ 84-
89.
309. See generally Prince Edward Island Compensation Act §§ 37-39; Quebec Com-
pensation Act § 35; Nova Scotia Compensation Act §§ 33-34; British Columbia Compen-
sation Act §§ 17-20; Alberta Compensation Act §§ 64-72; Saskatchewan Compensation
Act §§ 82-98; New Brunswick Compensation Act § 38.6-.8; Newfoundland Compensa-
tion Act §§ 65-74; Manitoba Compensation Act §§ 28-37.
310. See, e.g., Prince Edward Island Compensation Act § 6(2); British Columbia Com-
pensation Act §§ 5(2), 6; Alberta Compensation Act § 51(2); Saskatchewan Compensa-
tion Act § 32(2).
311. See generally Quebec Compensation Act §§ 38-43; Nova Scotia Compensation
Act §§ 37-40; British Columbia Compensation Act §§ 22-27; Alberta Compensation Act
§§ 51-63; Saskatchewan Compensation Act §§ 67-80; New Brunswick Compensation
Act §§ 37-38; Newfoundland Compensation Act §§ 73-83; Manitoba Compensation Act
§§ 38-45.
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indemnity, maximum amount of indemnity, or both.312 No time limit
exists for receipt of lost income benefits. At age 65, however, benefits are
replaced by indemnity for pension benefits lost due to the disability. 313
Victims of workplace harm usually lack job retention or reinstatement
rights. However, in both Ontario and Prince Edward Island, employers
must offer suitable jobs to injured workers with at least one year of contin-
uous, pre-injury employment. 314 Prince Edward Island also protects claim-
ants from discharge during the Board's claim evaluation period, 315 but
limits the re-employment obligation to one year.316
III. Comparative Analysis
A. Coverage
Canadian and U.S. law both impose compliance duties on employers.
Canadian laws impose broad, performance-oriented duties, such as provid-
ing training, competent supervision, and properly maintained equip-
ment,317 in addition to compliance duties under specific safety and health
standards. Moreover, Canadian law often obliges various workplace par-
ties to protect workers without regard to whether an employment relation-
ship exists.318 Other worksite parties, such as suppliers, the self-employed,
and independent contractors, are obligated to protect employees other than
their own under Canadian law.319 Except for employers who create or con-
trol access to hazards, U.S. law restricts compliance duties more narrowly
to a party's employees. 320
Efforts to expand U.S. requirements to parallel the Canadian model
have met with mixed results. OSHA, OSHRC, and the courts require con-
struction contractors to protect another employer's employees from stan-
dards violations.32' Building owners also may have limited duties to all
workers on their property.322 Chemical manufacturers are required to pro-
312. See, e.g., Prince Edward Island Compensation Act §§ 46-47; Quebec Compensa-
tion Act § 45; Ontario Insurance Act § 54; Nova Scotia Compensation Act §§ 41-43;
British Columbia Compensation Act § 31; Saskatchewan Compensation Act §§ 76,
77.01-79; Newfoundland Compensation Act § 78.
313. See Prince Edward Island Compensation Act § 43; Ontario Insurance Act § 44;
British Columbia Compensation Act § 24(4); Newfoundland Compensation Act § 75.
314. See Prince Edward Island Compensation Act § 86; Ontario Compensation Act
§ 54.
315. See Prince Edward Island Compensation Act § 86(1)(a).
316. See id. § 86(5).
317. See discussion supra Parts III.C.1, III.E.
318. See discussion supra Part III.C.3-4.
319. See discussion supra Part III.A.
320. See 29 U.S.C. §652(5) (defining employer subject to the act as one having
employees); see also discussion supra Part II.C-II.C.1.
321. See BOKAT, supra note 77, at 411-17.
322. See Building & Construction Trades v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258, 1267-69 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (suggesting OSH Act liability may be imposed on building owners); 59 Fed. Reg.
40,971-72 (1994) (OSHA's final Asbestos Standard concludes that building owners may
be regulated under the Act); 59 Fed. Reg. 15,968, 16,024 (1994) (proposing compliance
duties under Indoor Air Quality standard for building owners who are statutory
employers).
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vide product users with notice of hazards.323 Construction professionals
such as architects or engineers, however, have compliance responsibilities
at sites where they perform services only if they contractually assume
them.3 24 Legislative initiatives to expand compliance duties to general con-
tractors, subcontractors, property owners, and construction professionals
have failed.325 Recently, the D.C. Circuit refused to impose liability on a
manufacturer for violations committed by its subcontractor.326
Canadian law allows adaptation of compliance obligations to contem-
porary work arrangements other than traditional employer and employee
relationships. 327 U.S. law is less adaptable.328 It is therefore more likely to
leave protection gaps: some employers bear compliance duties, while others
bear none.
Canadian law also covers classes of employees that U.S. law excludes.
Under Canadian law, public and private sector workers enjoy equal protec-
tions from hazards.329 U.S. law provides no protection to local government
employees. 330 Federal agencies must obey an Executive Order incorporat-
ing many of the Act's requirements, but no enforcement mechanism is pro-
vided.331 Some states protect local government employees, but non-
complying public employers are often not penalized.332 Other exceptions
from OSH Act coverage have no counterparts in Canadian law.3 33
Canadian law defines protection more broadly than does U.S. law.
Employers have broad duties to train workers in hazard recognition and to
ensure safety of structures and equipment.334 U.S. law imposes no compa-
rable duties.335 Provincial laws may regulate sexual harassment or disabil-
323. See 29 C.F.R. §1910.1200 (stating that the hazard communication standard
requires manufacturers of chemicals to include material safety data sheets with chemi-
cals shipped in interstate commerce). It is generally assumed that only employers who
are also manufacturers are governed by these requirements.
324. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
325. See H.R. ReP. No. 103-825, pt. 1, at 116 (1994); S. REP. No. 102-453, pt. 1, at 88
(1992) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 103-825].
326. See IBP v. Herman, 144 F.3d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (refusing to hold plant opera-
tor responsible for violations of a subcontractor).
327. See generally Clyde W. Summers, Contingent Employment in the United States, 18
CoMp. LAB. I.J. 503 (1997) (describing non-traditional work relationships which have
increased in prominence in the past twenty years).
328. The D.C. Circuit's decision in IBP v. Herman suggests it may be difficult to
impose OSH Act liability on prime contractors outside construction.
329. See discussion supra Part III.Al.
330. See 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (excluding governments from definition of employers
subject to the OSH Act).
331. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
332. See discussion supra Part IIA.2.; See also H.R. REP. No. 103-825, pt. 1, supra note
325, at 33-4 (1994).
333. See discussion supra Part I.
334. See discussion supra Parts III.C.1, III.E.
335. Many OSHA standards include hazard-specific training requirements. See, e.g.,
29 C.F.R § 1910.109 (g)(3)(iii)(a) (stating that a vehicle operator transporting explo-
sives must be trained); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119(g) (stating that employees involved in
processes governed by process safety management standards must receive training); 29
C.F.R § 1910.134(b) (stating that employees must receive training in respirator work);
29 C.F.R. § 1910.147(e) (stating that employees must receive training in lockout proce-
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ity discrimination as safety and health concerns. 336 In the United States,
these are employment discrimination issues.337 Quebec requires alternate
work assignments to pregnant and lactating women;338 OSHA requires
alternate work only for employees overexposed to select toxins.339 Cana-
dian law also authorizes regulation of products and equipment, though
such authority is rarely exercised. OSHA lacks this authority.340
B. Standard-Setting
Standard-setting differs substantially between the United States and
Canada. In the United States, Congress delegates to agencies discretion to
regulate within defined boundaries.341 Procedures assume that agencies,
after providing notice and considering comments, will rationally resolve
contested issues.342 Courts review rules to ensure that procedures are fol-
lowed, that factual findings have evidentiary support, and that policy reso-
lutions are rational and within delegated authority.343
In contrast, Canada de-emphasizes the administrative processes. Laws
specify no criteria for setting standards.344 Canadian standards usually
emerge from bilateral negotiations between labor and employer associa-
tions, in which government facilitates consensus.345 Public notice of rules
is provided after an agreement is reached,346 and judicial review is not
dures); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(1) (stating that employees exposed to lead above the
action level must receive training); 29 C.F.R § 1910.1028(j)(iii) (stating that employees
exposed to benzene above the action level must receive training).
336. See, e.g., Saskatchewan Safety Regulations, §§ 36-7, 81.
337. See generally Faragher v. Boca Raton, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998) (analyzing harass-
ment as sex discrimination); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (1998)
(analyzing harassment as sex discrimination).
338. See Quebec Safety Act § 4.
339. See, e.g., UAW v. Pendergrass, 878 F.2d 389 (1989) (describing OSHA's medical
removal protection policy); 57 Fed. Reg. 22,290 (1992); 43 Fed. Reg. 52, 972 (1978); 29
C.F.R. 1910.1025(k) (adopting MRP under lead standard); 50 Fed. Reg. 51, 154 (1985)
(adopting MRP for cotton dust standard); 52 Fed. Reg. 34,460 (1987) (adopting MRP
under benzene standard); 57 Fed. Reg. 22,290 (1992) (adopting MRP under formalde-
hyde standard); 57 Fed. Reg. 42,102 (adopting MRP under cadmium standard).
340. The Toxic Substance Control Act authorizes the EPA to regulate products and
equipment. See 15 U.S.C. § 2601.
341. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980)
(noting that the delegation doctrine requires a court to find constraints on OSHA regula-
tory discretion). See also id. at 672-6 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (discussing the delega-
tion doctrine); American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 543-7
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (requiring
OSHA to articulate decision making criteria for setting safety standards).
342. See AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
343. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); AFL-
CIO v. Marshall 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir 1979); Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v.
Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1158 (3d Cir. 1974) (describing questions court must answer
during judicial review).
344. Canadian law includes nothing comparable to the delegation doctrine because
rulemaking is an exercise of legislative not executive function under a parliamentary
system of government.
345. See discussion supra Part III.A. In some provinces, trilateral negotiations pro-
duce consensus rules. See Ontario Safety Act § 13(2).
346. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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available.347 Canadian law implicitly assumes that neither labor nor man-
agement will agree to rules adverse to their interests. Negotiated rules sub-
stitute for administrative procedures to ensure rationality.
Scholars have criticized the procedural formalism of the U.S.
approach, preferring Canada's consensus approach.345 The Canadian
approach has limits, however. For example, Canada narrowly restricts par-
ticipation in rule development, excluding many parties whose interests are
recognized in U.S. rulemaking procedures. Moreover, Canadian standards
are officially established through labor-management negotiation, which
impedes rule development. Consequently, the pace of regulation in
Canada is as slow as in the United States, even though Canada imposes
fewer procedural hurdles. While U.S. law mandates regulation in some
instances, Canadian law imposes no mandatory duty to regulate, so formal
pressure to hasten regulation is absent.349 Also, the Canadian negotiation-
based standards usually adopt consensus rules agreed to elsewhere-a pro-
cess that would be unacceptable in U.S. rulemaking.350 Finally, Canadian
law does not define when regulations adequately protect employees, but
presumes that bargaining protects employee interests; in contrast, U.S. law
mandates employee protective standards.351 In some instances, the Cana-
dian consensus approach provides greater protection for employees, 352 in
others, less.3 53
347. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
348. See generally EuGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING By THE BOOK: THE
PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982);Jody Freeman, Collaborative Govern-
ance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1992); Philip Harter, Negotiating
Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEo. L.J. 1 (1982);John T. Scholz, Cooperative Regula-
tory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness, 85 AM. POL. Scl. REv. 115
(1991).
349. For example, in 1995 Ontario disbanded the chemical exposure limit reevalua-
tion process and has failed to reestablish an alternative. See Occupational Disease; Union
Will Push Ontario Government to Bolster Workplace Exposure Protections, 28 O.S.H. Rep.
(BNA) 935 (Dec. 23, 1998).
350. In AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11' Circ. 1992), the Eleventh Circuit
rejected OSHA's efforts to adopt private consensus standards without completing
rulemaking for each regulated toxin.
351. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 541 (requiring
OSHA to place preeminent value on protecting employee safety). See also Public Citizen
Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150 (1983).
352. For example, in 1971, OSHA adopted then current ACGIH exposure limits as
OSHA standards. See generally AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d at 968-69. OSHA has been
generally unable to revise these exposure limits, although limits for individual sub-
stances have been superceded by comprehensive 6(b) standards. See Sidney A. Shapiro
& Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: *Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative
Reform, 6 YALEJ. ON REG. 1, 24 (1989). Canada's consensus approach makes possible
periodic updates of exposure limits to conform to current ACGIH recommendations. In
many cases, reliance on current ACGIH exposure limits provides increased protection to
employees than does reliance on OSHA exposure limits. See generally 54 Fed. Reg. 2332
(Jan. 19, 1989) (Preamble to the final rule on Air Contaminants). In addition, consen-
sus has permitted adoption of ergonomics standards in British Columbia and Saskatch-
ewan, but politics has stalled development of U.S. ergonomic rules. See, e.g., 28 O.S.H.
Rep. (BNA) 85, 139 (July 1, 1998).
353. The United States has more comprehensive standards regulating toxic hazards
than do Canadian provinces and tends to lead, rather than follow, Canadian regulation.
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Negotiated rules should produce reasonable regulations when parties
have comparable bargaining strength, equal access to information, and
mutual interests in protective regulation. In Canada, union density is
higher than in the United States,354 and there is greater acceptance of
labor's involvement in policy-making. 355 Further, the Canadian govern-
ment may fund research efforts at labor's request, further supporting its
bargaining role.3 5 6 Also, labor and management regularly negotiate other
terms of employment at the provincial level. All of these factors enhance
labor's bargaining strength and information, fostering its ability to obtain
mutually beneficial agreements.
In the United States, unions are weaker. Unions negotiating OSHA
standards may have no on-going bargaining relationship with employee
associations involved in rulemaking.357 Neither labor nor management
can veto regulation by avoiding consensus. Conversely, agreement
between labor and management does not assure promulgation of negoti-
ated rules. In the absence of bargaining strength, the employee protective
mandate in law may provide U.S. labor with leverage to obtain strong stan-
dards that Canadian law presumes will flow from comparable bargaining
strength.
Regulation may be easier to implement in Canada than in the United
States for several additional reasons. Under Canada's parliamentary gov-
ernment, regulations are issued by the legislative branch and are not judi-
cially reviewable. This minimizes the prospect that analytic hurdles
imposed on agencies by Congress and the courts will delay regulation.358
In the United States, possible regulatory review by the courts or Congress
means the results of negotiation may not produce the final rule.3 59
For example, although the pace of OSHA standard-setting has been criticized, it has
adopted over thirty comprehensive toxic standards. Canadian provinces have fewer sub-
stance-specific, comprehensive regulations.
354. See Gilbert & Heckman, supra note 194.
355. See id. at 4-5.
356. See discussion supra Part III.A.
357. Usually, unions collectively bargain with individual employers. Industry-wide
collective bargaining is rare. Trade associations representing groups of employers domi-
nate OSHA rulemaking. These trade associations have little involvement with collective
bargaining, but represent members on legislative and regulatory issues. Individual
employers may comment during rulemaking, but rarely take the lead in advocating
industry-wide regulatory positions.
358. Administrative law scholarship refers to this process as "ossification." See gener-
ally Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41
DuKE ILJ. 1315 (1992); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent
Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 Texas L.R. 483
(1997) ("The term 'ossification' refers to the inefficiencies that plague regulatory pro-
grams because of analytic hurdles that agencies must clear in order to adopt new rules").
Heightened standards of judicial review exaggerate this problem. See Shapiro &
McGarity, supra note 352; see also notes 267, 305 and accompanying text.
359. See Patricia Wald, Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: A New Role for the
Courts, 10 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1, 1-3, 11-35 (1985) (describing potential problems with
consensus when judicial review is sought); William Funk, When Smoke Gets In Your
Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest - EPA's Woodstove Standard, 18 ENvTL.
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Regulation also may be easier to finalize in Canada because rule viola-
tions often go unpunished. Employers may acquiesce in enactment of rules
which serve only as "points of departure" for negotiating compliance
duties with inspectors. 360 By contrast, U.S. employers may be penalized
for each violation.361 Many U.S. employers believe exceeding requirements
is needed to avoid citation.362 Their acquiescence to the establishment of
rules may therefore involve greater risk
U.S. notions of procedural due process and the availability of judicial
review explain the greater reliance on specific, legalistic rules compared
with Canada's greater reliance on performance standards.363 Compared
with U.S. regulations, Canada's regulations are less technically detailed but
may impose duties comparable to those of U.S. specification rules. Cana-
dian labor ministries may finally interpret rules, enabling them to add spe-
cifics to general requirements. In contrast, OSHA has limited ability to
supplement, clarify, or interpret performance-oriented rules without initiat-
ing new rulemaking because its interpretations may be reviewed by
OSHRC and the courts. 36 4 OSHA therefore prefers more detailed, legalistic
rules to minimize differing interpretations by courts or OSHRC. 3 65
L. 55, 89-98 (1987) (arguing that regulatory negotiation substitutes resolution of private
rights for public values).
360. See Kathryn Harrison, Is Cooperation the Answer? Canadian Environmental
Enforcement in Comparative Context, 14'J. POL'Y ANALYsIs & MGMT. 221, 225 (1995)
(citing ANDm-W THOMPSON, ENviRoNMENTAL REGULATION IN CANADA: AN ASSESSMENT OF
THE PRocEss 30 (1980)).
361. See, e.g., United States v. Ladish Malting Co., 1998 WL 35167, at 6 (7" Cir.)
("complying with the law 99.99% of the time is not a defense to disobedience the other
0.01%").
362. See American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 939 F.2d 975 (D.C.Cir. 1991). See
generally Harrison, supra note 360.
363. A rule is performance-oriented where it states a goal, but permits discretion in
choosing the means to achieve the goal. The range of permitted discretion varies from
the very broad, i.e., an employer must adequately train employees, to the very narrow,
i.e., an employer must meet I ppm exposure limit through sole reliance on engineering
controls. Specification standards, in contrast, state the required form of compliance,
leaving employers little discretion, for instance that guardrails must be 42 inches high.
By legalistic, we mean rules written with an expectation of judicial review by an outside
agency or a court.
364. See, e.g., Union Tank Car Co., 1997 WL 26611 (O.S.H.R.C.) (discussing
OSHRC's disagreement with Secretary's interpretation of whether employer must pro-
vide personal protective equipment without charge to employees); Reich v General
Motors Corp., 89 F.3d 313 (69 Cir. 1996) (affirming OSHRC decision that Secretary's
interpretation of standard is not consistent with its general terms).
365. When OSHA adopts general, performance-oriented standards, enforcement often
requires further interpretation. Where OSHA and OSHRC share responsibility for OSH
Act enforcement, OSHA does not control subsequent interpretations of its rules. To
avoid having OSHRC interpret performance standards differently than OSHA prefers,
the Agency adopts more detailed, specification-based standards. These minimize inter-
pretative inconsistencies between OSHA and OSHRC, but create more complicated,
legalistic standards. Professors Shapiro and McGarity have criticized Congress' choice
of the split enforcement model for resolving citations under OSH Act for these and other
reasons. See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 352, at 59-62.
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C. Enforcement
U.S. law relies on adversarial enforcement: the imposition of
mandatory citations and penalties for each observed violation.3 66 Canada
grants inspectors discretion to decide whether to cite violations. 36 7 In
Canada, even if issued, citations carry no penalty 368 and compliance
schedules are negotiated. Bills to abolish U.S. first-instance sanctions and
substitute cooperative enforcement have been reported in both houses of
Congress. 36 9 The advantages and disadvantages of Canada's system are
worth listing for that reason alone.
Canadian cooperative enforcement absorbs substantially more
resources than does the U.S. adversarial approach. Depending on the prov-
ince, Canada has three to seven times more inspectors than OSHA. 370
Canadian inspectors visit workplaces more frequently than their U.S. coun-
terparts. Ontario, for example, conducts approximately the same number
of total inspections as does OSHA, though it has only one-tenth as many
workplaces to cover.3 7 1 Canadian inspectors may visit a higher proportion
of covered employers, suggesting greater deterrent effect from the threat of
enforcement. OSHA has resources to visit high hazard U.S. workplaces
only once every 13 years and normal workplaces only once every 87
years.37 2 In contrast, Canadian inspectors regularly revisit establishments
to gauge whether uncited hazards are abated and may also renegotiate
compliance schedules. 37 3
In most Canadian provinces, employers bear the costs of increased
governmental presence at worksites. 3 74 Employer-paid workers' compensa-
tion premiums fund safety and health regulation, leaving provincial budg-
ets unaffected. In the United States, no equivalent link exists between
private workers' compensation premiums and safety and health enforce-
ment.375 In the United States, iterative inspections characteristic of coop-
366. See Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 101, at 729-37.
367. See discussion supra Part III.C.3.
368. See discussion supra Part III.C.3.
369. See SAFE Act, S. 1237, 105"' Cong. (1997); H.R. 1834, 104' h Cong. (1995).
370. GENERAL AcCOUNTING OFFicE, OccupATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH: PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS ARE WELL BELOw MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE PENALTIES (1992) [hereinafter GAO
PENALTIES]. In Ontario, for example, 50,000 inspectors are responsible for 287,000
workplaces. See GILBERT & HEcKMAN, supra note 189, at 49. In the United States, only
1,113 inspectors oversee 6 million workplaces. See OSHA FACTS (last modified Oct. 9,
1998) <http://www.osha-slc.gov/OshDoc/OSHFacts/OSHAFacts.html>.
371. See GILBERT & HEcKMAN, supra note 189, at 49.
372. See H.R. REP. No. 103-825, supra note 325, pt. 1, at 33-4 (1994); Clyde Summers,
Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U.
PA. L. REv. 457, 504-5 (1992).
373. See generally Richard Brown, Theory and Practice of Regulatory Enforcement:
Occupational Health and Safety Regulation in British Columbia, 16 LAw & POL'Y 63
(1994).
374. See discussion supra Parts II.F, III.F.
375. In all but six states, workers' compensation insurance is provided by private
companies. In Washington, West Virginia, Nevada, Ohio, North Dakota, and Wyoming,
workers' compensation insurance is provided by the state. Effective July 1999, private
insurers will have access to Nevada's workers' compensation market. In Washington,
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erative enforcement would require increased federal funding. Congress,
however, has shown little enthusiasm for increasing OSHA's enforcement
budget.3 76
In addition to its more intrusive inspection presence, Canadian coop-
erative enforcement features greater employee participation rights.
Employees stand in for government inspectors as compliance overseers.
Government inspectors facilitate the exercise of worker rights, intervening
only when internal resolution fails.3 77 Canada refers to this approach as
"internal responsibility."
Cooperative enforcement programs in the United States usually have
curtailed government inspections without increasing employee participa-
tion. OSHA's VPP program, for example, eliminates employee walkaround
rights,378 and OSHA's consultation program has excluded workers from
participation.379 Congress appears unlikely to increase employee involve-
ment requirements. Democrat proposals to mandate joint safety and
health committees have met stiff resistance, 380 while Republican bills to
abolish first instance sanctions restrict employee participation, rather than
expand it.381
Canadian cooperative enforcement may delay compliance and reduce
compliance obligations. First instance sanctions should encourage prompt
compliance. 38 2 Conversely, delayed penalties encourage delayed compli-
ance. OSHA's frequent citations carry little stigma. Penalties are low and
publicity is rare.38 3 0 SH A's recent cooperative programs may further
weaken deterrence by limiting citations or reducing penalties. However, in
Canada, where violations are less frequently penalized,38 4 prosecutions,
when initiated, carry substantial penalties and may match or exceed the
deterrence obtained through weak U.S. civil fines. 38 5 Employers subject to
quasi-criminal prosecutions may fear stigma and, in addition, both employ-
ees and supervisors may be prosecuted.38 6
Cooperative enforcement may weaken employer incentives to comply
fully with the rules. Canadian inspectors renegotiate compliance duties
Wyoming, and Nevada safety and health regulation is also a state function. 29 C.F.R.
1952.120, .290, .340.
376. See generally Summers, supra note 372.
377. See generally Part III.C.4-5 (detailing joint committee functions and employee
rights to refuse work).
378. See Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 101, at 737.
379. See id. at 744. OSHA considered and rejected a requirement that employers ben-
efiting from consultation allow workers to participate in the process. See 42 Fed. Reg.
41,386 (1977). In 1998, Congress passed legislation codifying the consultation pro-
gram, which guarantees worker participation. See Occupational Safety and Health
Administration Compliance Assistance Authorization Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-197,
112 Stat. 638 (1998).
380. See Watchman, supra note 129, at 121-6.
381. See supra note 373; See also Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 101, at 757.
382. See Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 101, at 732-4.
383. See generally GAO PENAL-nEs, supra note 374.
384. See Brown, supra note 377, at 66, 83.
385. See supra pp.70-74 (detailing provincial penalties).
386. See id.; cf. United States v. Doig, 950 F.2d at 411.
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with each inspection visit. Rules are the starting point for negotiations. 3 87
Uniformity of compliance is sacrificed when employers obtain varied com-
pliance schedules. 38 8 No records are kept of uncited violations.38 9 Few
records exist of what alternative compliance inspectors accept.3 90 In the
United States, renegotiation of compliance duties is rare, other than in set-
tlement of citations. Uniformity in compliance is prized, and first instance
sanctions ensure the documentation of inspection activities.
Proponents of cooperative enforcement suggest that inspectors should
not cite or assess penalties against "good employers" or for insignificant
violations.391 Citations or orders and fines would be reserved for repeat
violators or serious violations.39 2 Where cooperation is prized, however,
inspectors may be reluctant to initiate enforcement.3 93 They may repeat-
edly lower compliance expectations to avoid enforcement. 39 4
There is little empirical evidence that cooperative enforcement works
well at all, although it is often praised.39 5 An environmental study of
Canadian cooperative enforcement and American adversarial enforcement
was skeptical of the benefits of cooperation. 39 6 British Columbia's cooper-
ative enforcement of safety and health rules has also been evaluated
skeptically. 39 7
D. Employee Rights
Compared with U.S. law, Canadian law provides employees greater
rights to participate in workplace safety and health through joint commit-
tees. Canadian employees exercising these and other health and safety
rights also enjoy greater protection against retaliation than do American
workers. These enhanced rights can be seen as proper accessories to
387. See Harrison, supra note 364, at 225-6 (citing ANDREW THOMPSON, ENVIRONMEN-
TAL REGULATION IN CANADA: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PROcEss 33 (1980)).
388. See generally Brown, supra note 377.
389. See id. at 73-6.
390. See id. at 71-6.
391. See generally BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 352; Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra
note 101.
392. See Harrison, supra note 364, at 223 (citing George Hoberg, Technology, Political
Structure, and Social Regulation: A Cross-National Analysis, 18 Comp. Pol. 357, 357-376
(1986) (noting that little empirical evidence supports this view of cooperative
enforcement)).
393. See generally Bridget M. Hutter, Regulation in Regulatory Enforcement Styles, 11
LAW & POL'Y 153 (1989).
394. See Harrison, supra note 364, at 236; see generally Brown, supra note 377.
395. See generally Harrison, supra note 364.
396. See id. at 236. The author concludes her results cast "doubt on the relatively
untested assumption that cooperative enforcement is equally if not more effective than
the adversarial approach." Id.
397. See Brown, supra note 373, at 80. Brown evaluated whether employers were
penalized if subsequent inspections revealed non-abatement of cited violations. He con-
cluded "many employers consistently fail to comply with regulatory requirements, but
relatively few are penalized." Id. In British Columbia, the percentage of inspections
resulting in penalties is approximately one percent. Penalties were assessed against less
than 20% of employers whose performance was so poor they received an average of five
or more orders per inspection. See id.
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"internal responsibility," a regime substituting employees for government
inspectors in first-line enforcement. Employee rights are accompanied by
compliance duties.398 Employees must engage in self-protection and
report hazards, and may be punished for the failure to do so.
Unions have collectively bargained for joint committees in some U.S.
workplaces. 3 99 Legislation pending in Congress between 1991 and 1994
would have mandated joint committees in U.S. workplaces.40 0 These pro-
posals did not substitute enhanced employee participation for governmen-
tal enforcement along Canadian lines. Rather, the committees were viewed
as adding a new compliance burden. The requirements were strongly
opposed by the business community.4 0 1
Committees may augment employee involvement in safety and
health,40 2 which may in turn improve safety and health performance. 40 3
They may also foster problem-solving sklls.4° 4 Committees may enhance
the effectiveness of inspections,40 5 increase awareness of hazards, and
encourage abatement activity. Limited evidence suggests that workers'
compensation committees leads to reduced injuries and illnesses.4 ° 6
Committee effectiveness probably depends on a combination of
employer commitment, union presence, and enforcement pressure.40 7
Employer commitment may facilitate operations and responsiveness to rec-
ommendations. 40 8 Unions may help gather information, augment protec-
tion against discharge, communicate key rights,40 9 and negotiate disputes.
Enforcement pressure may sharpen incentives to use committees to identify
hazards, so they can be corrected prior to the infliction of penalties. With-
out employer commitment, union presence, or enforcement pressure, com-
mittees may not lead to improved safety and health performance. In
Canada, for example, Lewchuck found committees established before they
were legally mandated more effective than those established belatedly in
398. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.
399. See generally RUTm RuTTENBERG, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE ROLE OF LABOR MANAGE-
MENT COMMITTEES IN SAFEGUARDING WORKER SAFETY AND HEALTH (1990).
400. See H.. 3160, 102d Cong. (1991); H.R. 1280, 103d Cong. (1994).
401. See Watchman, supra note 129, at 89.
402. See id. at 74-75.
403. See id. See also Barry Reilly et at., Unions, Safety Committees and Workplace Inju-
ries, 33 BRITISH J. IND. REL. 275 (1995) (finding safety committees have a statistically
significant positive effect on workplace injuries).
404. See GILBERT & HECKMAN, supra note 189, at 29-31 (quoting Carolyn Tuohy &
Marcel Simard, The Impact of Joint Health and Safety Committees in Ontario and Quebec
(1993)); Watchman, supra note 129, at 83.
405. See Weil, supra note 130, at 17-20.
406. See GILBERT & HECKtm, supra note 189, at 31 (quoting W. Lewchuck et al., The
Effectiveness of Bill 70 and Joint Health and Safety Committees in Reducing Injuries in the
Workplace: The Case of Ontario, XXII:3 CANADIAN PUBLIC POLICY 225 (1996); Watchman,
supra note 129, at 71-72. But see Spieler, supra note 149, at 254-56 (stating that commit-
tees are ineffective without enforcement).
407. See generally THoMAs A. KocHAN Er AL., THE EF'ECTIVENESS OF UNION MANAGE-
MENT SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMITTEES (1977); RTTENBERG, supra note 399.
408. See OSHA Guidelines on Workplace Safety and Health Program Management, 54
Fed. Reg. 3904 (Jan. 26, 1989).
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response to mandates.410
Employee participation is enhanced by protection against retaliatory
discharge. In Canada, employees disciplined for exercising safety and
health rights may turn to Labor Boards or the courts for assistance.411
Retaliation is presumed when discipline follows close in time after exercise
of safety-related rights.412 By contrast, U.S. anti-retaliation protection may
be vindicated only by the Secretary of Labor. In the rare suits filed, no
presumption of retaliation exists. Not surprisingly, such protections are
often deemed ineffective. 413
Canadian and U.S. employees alike may refuse hazardous work. In
Canada, they may refuse most work posing a danger without loss of pay.4 14
U.S. employees enjoy only a far more limited right to refuse imminently
hazardous work,415 with protection against discharge, but not against wage
loss. OSHA must secure a court order to stop imminently hazardous work.
Canadian employees may seek hazard correction with minimal fear of
reprisal. Work refusals require employer response and inspectors may
order work stoppages and abatements, even when hazards are not immi-
nent. These features reward prompt hazard reporting. On the other hand,
Canadian law may overprotect work refusals for trivial or ulterior reasons.
In contrast, U.S. law underprotects employees. They may forfeit wages by
stopping work, their protection against discharge may be weak, and work
stoppages often may not effectively abate the hazards.416
E. Workers' Compensation
In the absence of workers' compensation, the remedy for negligently
inflicted work-related injuries in both Canada and the United States would
be tort suits allowing recovery of pain and suffering damages. In the
United States, employer defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of
risk, and fellow servant principles might limit liabilities. This is less true
in Canada, especially with respect to assumption of risk and fellow servant
doctrines. In both countries, workers' compensation supplants tort reme-
dies against employers. No-fault compensation is provided for work-related
harms.
Canada provides broader protection against tort liability for firms par-
ticipating in workers' compensation programs. Employers who pay premi-
ums to provincially-administered insurance funds gain protection against
tort suits for work-related harms from all workers. 417 In contrast, the
410. See GILBERT & HECKMAN, supra note 189, at 31 (quoting W. Lewchuck et al., The
Effectiveness of Bill 70 and Joint Health and Safety Committees in Reducing Injuries in the
Workplace: The Case of Ontario, XXII:3 CANItAIN PUBLIC POLiCY 225 (1996)).
411. See supra notes 259, 263.
412. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
413. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
414. See supra notes 251-255 and accompanying text.
415. See supra notes 109, 134, 135 and accompanying text.
416. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH: INSPECTORS'
OPINIONS ON IMPROVING OSHA EFFEcTvENss 41 (1990).
417. See discussion supra Part III.F.
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exclusivity of workers' compensation in the United States immunizes
employers from tort suits only by their own employees. 418
Canada may be more generous in compensating serious injury stem-
ming from willful employee misconduct. Canada also more uniformly
reimburses workers' compensation benefit payors for third-party damages.
Finally, Canada may be superior in coordinating workers' compensation
and safety and health concerns. Each province administers a monopoly
Fund to provide employers with workers' compensation insurance.419 This
monopoly Fund provides the most significant difference from the prevail-
ing U.S. model. Safety and health enforcement is largely funded by the
workers' compensation premiums. 420 Hence, when enforcement requires
increased resources, they can be secured through hiked workers' compen-
sation premiums, leaving no impact on provincial budgets.421
IV. Conclusion
Canadian law reaches more broadly than U.S. law-both as to what is
regulated and who must comply. In Canada, employers have fewer
defenses to putative violations and fewer forums in which to contest viola-
tions. Further, when violations are found, penalties are more substantial
than under U.S. law.
Canada treats safety and health policy as a bargain between labor and
management, with government facilitating negotiation. In standard-set-
ting, this bargaining allows only limited participation by other parties and
forecloses opportunities to challenge consensus rules. In enforcement,
labor and management have primary responsibility for identifying hazards.
Reliance on this bargaining paradigm may be reasonable in light of
Canada's increased union density and greater acceptance of labor's role in
workplace policymaking.
Canada provides a series of rights which empower employees to pro-
tect themselves. These employee rights may be crucial to credible enforce-
ment in a regime where government's enforcement role is weak. Joint
committees, the right to refuse hazardous work, and a prohibition on retali-
ation allow employees confidently to engage in worksite self-help. With
these rights, assuming the capacity to assert them is meaningful, Canadian
workers substitute for government inspectors as the first-line of safety and
health oversight.
Congress has repeatedly declined to require joint committees, guaran-
tee the right to refuse hazardous work, or adopt a ban on retaliation
enforceable by employees. Unless employees receive rights comparable to
those provided to Canadian workers, a shift toward cooperative safety and
health withdraws government oversight and leaves no other overseer.
Hence, without a substantial increase in employee rights, cooperative
418. See discussion supra Part II.D.
419. See discussion supra Part III.E.
420. See supra notes 279-283.
421. See discussion supra Part III.E.
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enforcement is likely to be less effective in the United States than in
Canada. Since empirical evidence provides little support for the superior
effectiveness of cooperation in Canada, adopting cooperative enforcement
policies in the United States is likely to weaken employer compliance
incentives.
Equally important, meaningful cooperative enforcement would proba-
bly require a substantial increase in OSHA's budget. Repeated visits to
negotiate compliance with employers or to mediate disputes between labor
and management are more time-intensive than adversarial inspections.
OSHA's current resources permit inspection of each high hazard workplace
every fifteen years. Resource demands of cooperative enforcement would
further weaken OSHA's deterrent effect, unless Congress were to increase
OSHA's budget substantially. As discussed earlier, there are no signs that
such an increase is likely.
Cooperative enforcement requires more money and greater employee
rights to supplement reduced government presence at the work site. Cur-
rent U.S. political climate suggests that neither will be available in the near
future. Without increased worker rights to self-help and greater resources,
the rubric of cooperation may mask government's abandonment of worker
protection.
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